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The Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London generated a massive backlash from across the political
spectrum.1 Kelo’s holding that the Public Use Clause of the
Fifth Amendment allows the taking of private property for
transfer to new private owners for the purpose of promoting
“economic development” was denounced by many on both the
1. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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right and the left. Forty-three states have enacted post-Kelo
reform legislation to curb eminent domain.2
The Kelo backlash probably resulted in more new state legislation than any other Supreme Court decision in history. The
closest competitor is Furman v. Georgia,3 which struck down all
then-existing state death penalty laws. In response, some thirty-five states and the federal government enacted new death
penalty statutes intended to conform to Furman’s requirements
between 1972 and 1976.4 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court’s 2003 decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health mandating same sex marriage under its state constitution5 has led some thirty other states to enact constitutional
amendments banning gay marriage between 2003 and 2008.6
Yet neither Furman nor Goodridge generated a legislative
backlash that extended to as many states as Kelo. Moreover,
the anti-gay marriage amendments cannot be solely attributed
to the backlash against Goodridge, since they were also spurred
by litigation that eventually led to pro-gay marriage state court
decisions in Connecticut and California.7 Thus, a strong case
can be made that Kelo has drawn a more extensive legislative
reaction than any other single court decision in American history.8

2. For the most complete and up to date listing of state post-Kelo legislative initiatives, see The Castle Coalition: Citizens Fighting Eminent Domain
Abuse, Enacted Legislation Since Kelo, http://www.castlecoalition.org/index
.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=510 (last visited May 17, 2009) [hereinafter Castle Coalition]. Other parts of the website also discuss proposed
and enacted federal legislation.
3. 408 U.S. 238, 256–67 (1972).
4. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–80 & n.23 (1976) (noting that
“at least 35 states” and the federal government had enacted new death penalty
statutes in response to Furman, and listing the state laws in question).
5. Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
6. For a list of states enacting constitutional bans on same-sex marriage,
see NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SAME SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL
UNIONS AND DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS (2008), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/
cyf/samesex.htm.
7. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 450–52 & n.70 (Cal. 2008),
superseded by CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health,
957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008).
8. I do not consider cases such as Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust
Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, and Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by U.S. CONST.
amend. XI, which were eventually overruled by constitutional amendment. It
is difficult to say whether one constitutional amendment can be considered a
more sweeping reaction than numerous state and federal laws.
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In light of the massive and unprecedented backlash Kelo
generated, prominent scholars and jurists such as Judge Richard A. Posner and Chief Justice John Roberts (when questioned about Kelo at his Senate confirmation), have suggested
that the political response demonstrates that legislative initiatives can protect property owners and that judicial intervention
may be unnecessary.9 Posner concluded that the political reaction to Kelo is “evidence of [the decision’s] pragmatic soundness.”10 Such arguments dovetail with the traditional view that
rights supported by majority public opinion will be protected by
democratic political processes and do not require additional
protection through judicial review.11 As James Madison famously wrote in The Federalist No. 10, “[i]f a faction consists of
less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by
regular vote.”12 Only “[w]hen a majority is included in a faction,” he argued, does “the form of popular government” enable
it to threaten “the rights of other citizens.”13
This Article challenges the validity of claims that the political backlash to Kelo has provided the same level of protection
for property owners as would a judicial ban on economic development takings. It is the first comprehensive analysis of the
Kelo backlash to date,14 and finds that the majority of the new9. See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term–Foreword: A
Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 98 (2005) (claiming that “the strong adverse public and legislative reactions to the Kelo decision” are a justification of
the decision). At his confirmation hearing before the Senate, then-Judge John
Roberts commented that the legislative reaction to Kelo shows that “this body
[Congress] and legislative bodies in the States are protectors of the people’s
rights as well” and “can protect them in situations where the Court has determined, as it did 5-4 in Kelo, that they are not going to draw that line.” Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 286 (2005).
10. Posner, supra note 9, at 98.
11. For perhaps the best-known modern statement of this argument, see
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87–88 (1980) (arguing that judicial review should focus on protecting citizens’ rights to participate in the political process and minority groups against oppression by the majority).
12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
13. Id.
14. The most complete earlier published analysis is Timothy Sandefur,
The “Backlash” So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain
Reform, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 709. Sandefur’s article is an excellent contribution to the literature, but was written too soon to take account of the ten referendum initiatives enacted in 2006, as well as several legislative reforms
enacted after the summer of 2006. I also provide a very different explanation
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ly enacted post-Kelo reform laws are likely to be ineffective. It
also suggests a tentative explanation for the often ineffective
nature of post-Kelo reform: widespread political ignorance that
enables state and federal legislators to pass off primarily cosmetic laws as meaningful reforms. I do not attempt to assess
either the validity of the Kelo decision or the desirability of
economic development takings as a policy matter.15 Instead, I
document the results of the Kelo backlash and provide a provisional explanation for the paucity of effective reform laws. By
extension, my analysis also calls into question the traditional
view that judicial review is not needed to protect individual
rights that enjoy strong majority support from the general public. At the same time, however, it is important to recognize that
a number of states have enacted effective post-Kelo reform
laws. The political response to Kelo was far from completely futile.
Part I describes the Kelo decision and then documents the
widespread backlash it generated. Both state-level and national surveys show overwhelming public opposition to economic
development takings—a consensus that cuts across gender, racial, ethnic, and partisan lines. The decision was also condemned by politicians and activists across the political spectrum ranging from Ralph Nader16 on the left to Rush Limbaugh
of the pattern of effective and ineffective reforms than Sandefur does, as well
as providing extensive public-opinion data. An article by Janice Nadler, Shari
Seidman Diamond, and Matthew M. Patton analyzes public opinion on Kelo,
but does not examine the legislation passed as a result, and does not explain
the three anomalies discussed in Part III of this paper. See Janice Nadler et
al., Government Takings of Private Property, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 286 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008). Noel D.
Campbell, R. Todd Jewell, and Edward J. López’s analysis of post-Kelo reform
takes into account only thirty-seven state laws, and does not consider the federal response. See Edward J. López et al., Pass a Law, Any Law, State Legislative Responses to the Kelo Backlash (June 17, 2008) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=1022385. Andrew Morriss’s forthcoming article only considers reforms enacted by state legislatures, omitting both the federal response
and state referendum initiatives. See Andrew Morriss, Symbol or Substance?
An Empirical Assessment of State Responses to Kelo (Univ. of Ill. Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. LE07-037), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=1113582.
15. I do address these issues in Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping
Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183,
190–210, 233–44 (2007) [hereinafter Somin, Grasping Hand].
16. Nader has been a longstanding critic of economic development takings. See, e.g., Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsch, Making Eminent Domain Humane,
49 VILL. L. REV. 207 (2004) (arguing that they should be banned in most cas-
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on the right.17 Traditional models of democratic politics predict
that such a broad political consensus is likely to result in effective legislative action.18
Part II considers the state and federal political response to
Kelo. Thirty-six state legislatures have enacted post-Kelo
reform laws. However, twenty-two of these are largely symbolic
in nature, providing little or no protection for property owners.
Several of the remainder were enacted by states that had little
or no history of condemning property for economic development. Only seven states that had recently engaged in significant numbers of economic development and blight condemnations have enacted post-Kelo legislative reforms with any real
teeth. The limited reforms enacted by the federal government
are likely to be no more effective than most of the state laws.
The major exceptions to the pattern of ineffective post-Kelo
reforms are the eleven states that recently enacted reforms by
popular referendum. Six or seven of these provide meaningful
new protection for property owners. Strikingly, citizen-initiated
referendum initiatives have led to the passage of much stronger
laws than those enacted through referenda initiated by state
legislatures.
Part III advances a potential explanation for the pattern of
ineffective post-Kelo reform. While there is overwhelming public support for measures banning economic development takings, some thirty of the forty-nine states that had not enacted
reforms before Kelo, 19 as well as the federal government, have
es). For his statement denouncing Kelo, see Ralph Nader, Statement, June 23,
2005, http://ml.greens.org/pipermail/ctgp-news/2005-June/000507.html (last
visited May 17, 2009) (“The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of
New London mocks common sense, tarnishes constitutional law and is an affront to fundamental fairness.”).
17. For Limbaugh’s denunciation of Kelo, see Rush Limbaugh: Liberals
Like Stephen Breyer Have Bastardized the Constitution (Free Republic radio
transcript Oct. 12, 2005), available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/1501453/posts (“Government can kick the little guy out of his and her
homes and sell those home [sic] to a big developer who’s going to pay a higher
tax base to the government. Well, that’s not what the takings clause was
about. It’s not what it is about. It’s just been bastardized, and it gets bastardized because you have justices on the court who will sit there and impose
their personal policy preferences rather than try to get the original intent of
the Constitution.”).
18. See, e.g., ROBERT S. ERIKSON ET AL., STATEHOUSE DEMOCRACY 78–82
(1993) (arguing that state public policy closely follows majority public opinion).
19. This figure does not include the state of Utah, which enacted effective
eminent domain reform prior to Kelo. See discussion of the Utah law in note 85
and accompanying text.
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enacted either ineffective reforms, or none at all. I tentatively
suggest the theory that the ineffectiveness of much post-Kelo
reform is largely due to widespread political ignorance. Survey
data collected for this Article shows that the vast majority of
citizens do not know whether their states have passed postKelo reform legislation and even fewer know whether that legislation is likely to be effective.
Most voters are “rationally ignorant” of public policy, having little incentive to acquire any substantial knowledge about
the details of government actions. Studies have repeatedly
shown that most citizens have very little knowledge of politics
and public policy.20 Many are often ignorant even of many basic
facts about the political system.21 Such ignorance is a rational
response to the insignificance of any one vote to electoral outcomes; if a voter’s only reason to become informed is to ensure
that she votes for the “best” candidate in order to ensure that
individual’s election to office, this turns out to be almost no incentive at all because the likelihood that any one vote will be
decisive is infinitesimally small.22
The publicity surrounding Kelo made the public at least
somewhat aware of the problem of economic development takings. But it probably did not lead voters to closely scrutinize the
details of proposed reform legislation. Few citizens have the
time or inclination to delve into such matters and many are often ignorant of the very existence of even the most important
legislative measures. In Part III, I present survey data showing
that the vast majority of Americans were indeed ignorant of the
content of post-Kelo reform legislation in their states. In an
August 2007 Saint Index survey, only 21% of respondents could
correctly answer whether or not their state had passed eminent
domain reform legislation since Kelo, and only 13% both knew
whether their state had passed legislation and correctly indicated whether that legislation was likely to be effective.23
20. See Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89
IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1290–304 (2004) [hereinafter Somin, Political Ignorance]
(summarizing evidence of extensive voter ignorance); Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRITICAL REV. 413, 413–19 (1998) [hereinafter Somin, Voter Ignorance] (same).
21. Somin, Voter Ignorance, supra note 20, at 416–19.
22. For a more detailed discussion, see id. at 435–38.
23. See CTR. FOR ECON. & CIVIC OPINION AT UNIV. OF MASS./LOWELL, THE
SAINT INDEX POLL qstn. 9 (2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2007 SAINT
INDEX]. The survey included 1000 respondents in a nationwide random sam-
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The political ignorance hypothesis cannot definitively explain the outcomes of the Kelo backlash. However, it correctly
predicts three important events: the sudden emergence of the
Kelo backlash, in spite of the fact that economic development
takings were already permitted under existing precedent; the
passage of “position-taking” laws by both state and federal legislators; and the fact that that post-Kelo laws enacted by popular referendum tended to be much stronger than those enacted
by state legislatures. No other theory can easily account for all
three of these seeming anomalies. The political ignorance hypothesis therefore better accounts for the available evidence than
the leading alternative explanation: that the enactment of effective post-Kelo reforms was stymied by interest group lobbying.
I. KELO AND ITS BACKLASH
A. THE KELO DECISION24
The Kelo case arose from the condemnation of ten residences and five other properties as part of a 2000 “development
plan” in New London, Connecticut, that sought to transfer the
property to private developers for the stated purpose of promoting economic growth in the area.25 None of the properties were
alleged to be “blighted or otherwise in poor condition.”26 The
condemnations were initiated pursuant to a plan prepared by
the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a “private
non-profit entity established . . . to assist the City in planning
economic development.”27
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court endorsed the New
London takings, upheld the economic development rationale for
condemnation, and mandated broad judicial deference to government decision making on public use issues.28 Justice Stevens’ majority opinion endorsed a “policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field.”29 The Court rejected the property
ple. See also CTR. FOR ECON. & CIVIC OPINION AT UNIV. OF MASS./LOWELL,
THE SAINT INDEX POLL (2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2005 SAINT
INDEX].
24. For a more detailed discussion of Kelo’s holding, from which this brief
summary is drawn, see Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 15, at 223–33.
25. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473–77 (2005).
26. Id. at 475.
27. Id. at 473.
28. Id. at 478–85.
29. Id. at 480.
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owners’ argument that the transfer of their property to private
developers rather than to a public body required any heightened degree of judicial scrutiny.30 It also refused to require the
City to provide any evidence that the takings were likely to actually achieve the claimed economic benefits that provided
their justification in the first place.31 On all these points, the
Kelo majority emphasized that courts should not “second-guess
the City’s considered judgments about the efficacy of the development plan.”32
Despite this result, Kelo may have actually represented a
slight tightening of judicial scrutiny relative to earlier cases
such as Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, which held that
the public use requirement is satisfied so long as “the exercise
of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.”33 Moreover, the fact that four Justices not
only dissented but actually concluded that the economic development rationale should be categorically forbidden shows that
the judicial landscape on public use has changed.34 A fifth, Justice Anthony Kennedy, signed on to the majority opinion, but
also wrote a concurrence emphasizing that heightened scrutiny
of eminent domain decisions should be applied in cases where
there is evidence that a condemnation was undertaken as a result of “impermissible favoritism” toward a private party.35 The
fact that four (and possibly five) Justices had serious misgivings about the Court’s ultra-deferential approach to public use
issues is a major change from the unanimous endorsement of
that very position in Midkiff. Although a major defeat for property owners, Kelo also represented a small doctrinal step forward.
B. THE PUBLIC REACTION
Although Kelo was consistent with existing precedent, the
decision was greeted with widespread outrage that cut across
partisan, ideological, racial, and gender lines. The U.S. House
of Representatives immediately passed a resolution denouncing

30. Id. at 485–86.
31. Id. at 487–88.
32. Id. at 488.
33. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
34. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 499–505 (O’Conner, J., dissenting); id. at 519–23
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Kelo by a lopsided 365-33 vote.36 In addition to expected denunciations from conservatives and libertarians,37 Kelo was condemned by numerous liberal political leaders including former
President Bill Clinton,38 then-Democratic National Committee
Chair Howard Dean,39 and prominent African-American politician and California Representative Maxine Waters.40 The
NAACP, the AARP, the liberal Southern Christian Leadership
Conference, and others had filed a joint amicus brief in Kelo
urging the Court to rule in favor of the property owners.41 So
too had the generally conservative Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty.42
Public opinion mirrored the widespread condemnation of
Kelo by political elites and activists. In two national surveys
conducted in the fall of 2005, 81% and 95% of respondents were
opposed to Kelo.43 As Table 1 demonstrates, opposition to the
decision cut across racial, ethnic, partisan, and gender lines.44
The data in the table comes from two 2005 polls on Kelo, one
conducted by the Saint Index and one by Zogby. In the Saint
Index survey, which has the better-worded question of the two
national polls,45 Kelo was opposed by 77% of men, 84% of wom36. H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. 2005; 151 CONG. REC. H5592–93 (daily ed.
June 29, 2005) (enacted); Adam Karlin, A Backlash on Seizure of Property,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 6, 2005, at 1 (describing massive anti-Kelo
backlash).
37. See, e.g., Limbaugh, Liberals Like Stephen Breyer, supra note 17. The
New London property owners were represented by the Institute for Justice, a
prominent libertarian public interest law firm. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 471.
38. See Eric Kriss, More Seek Curbs on Eminent Domain, SYRACUSE POSTSTANDARD, July 31, 2005, at A16 (noting Clinton’s opposition to the ruling).
39. See KSL TV, Howard Dean Speaks to Utah Democrats (KSL television
broadcast July 16, 2005), available at http://tv.ksl.com/index.php?nid=148&
sid=6641 (quoting Dean as denouncing “a [R]epublican-appointed Supreme
Court that decided they can take your house and put a Sheraton Hotel in
there”).
40. See Charles Hurt, Congress Assails Domain Ruling, WASH. TIMES, July 1, 2005, at A1 (quoting Waters denouncing Kelo as “the most un-American
thing that can be done”).
41. See Brief for the National Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored
People et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2004) (No. 04-108).
42. See Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2004) (No.
04-108).
43. See infra tbl.1. The differences between the two surveys are likely due
to a difference in question wording.
44. See infra tbl.1.
45. The Zogby survey question asked respondents whether they agreed
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en, 82% of whites, 72% of African-Americans, and 80% of Hispanics.46 The decision was also opposed by 79% of Democrats,
85% of Republicans, and 83% of Independents. Moreover, public
opposition to Kelo was deep as well as broad. In the Saint Index
survey, 63% of respondents not only disagreed with the decision, but said that they did so “strongly.”47 A 2006 Saint Index
survey found that 71% of respondents supported reform laws
intended to ban “the taking of private property for private development” projects, and 43% supported such laws “strongly.”48

“with the recent Supreme Court ruling that allowed a city in Connecticut to
take the private property of one citizen and give it to another citizen to use for
private development?” ZOGBY INT’L, AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION
SURVEY 27 qstn. 28 (Nov. 2, 2005) [hereinafter ZOGBY INT’L] (emphasis added)
(on file with author). This wording ignores the fact that the legal rationale for
Kelo is that the takings are intended to promote “public” development. By contrast, the Saint Index survey asked respondents whether they supported or
opposed the Court’s decision “that local governments can take homes, business
and private property to make way for private economic development if officials
believe it would benefit the public.” 2005 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23, qstn. 10.
(emphasis added).
46. See infra tbl.1.
47. 2005 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23, qstn. 10.
48. See CTR. FOR ECON. & CIVIC OPINION AT UNIV. OF MASS./LOWELL, THE
SAINT INDEX POLL qstn. 9 (2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2006 SAINT
INDEX]; see also Ilya Somin, Is Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform Bad for the
Poor?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1931, 1940 tbl.2 (2007).

2009]

POLITICAL RESPONSE TO KELO

2111

Table 1:
National Public Opinion on Kelo
Zogby
Survey49

Saint
Index Survey
200550

%
Agree

%
Disagree

%
Agree

%
Disagree

Total

2

95

18

81

Male

2

94

22

77

Female

2

95

14

84

White

2

94

17

82

African-American

0

97

28

72

Asian

0

100

26

68

Hispanic/Latino
Native American
Democrat
Independent
Republican

2
3
<1
3

98
94
99
92

18
7
20
17
14

80
93
79
83
85

Liberal

-

-

22

77

Moderate

-

-

18

81

Conservative

-

-

17

82

Gender

Racial/Ethnic
Group51

Party
Affiliation
Ideology

49. ZOGBY INT’L, supra note 45, at 27 qstn. 28. Question wording: “Do you
strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with
the recent Supreme Court ruling that allowed a city in Connecticut to take the
private property of one citizen and give it to another citizen to use for private
development?” Id. The totals given here differ slightly from those published by
Zogby because they correct a minor clerical error in Zogby’s tabulation.
50. 2005 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23, qstn. 10. Question wording: “The
U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that local governments can take homes,
business and private property to make way for private economic development
if officials believe it would benefit the public. How do you feel about this ruling?” Id.
51. The figures for Asians, Hispanics, and Native Americans may be unreliable because of small sample sizes. See ZOGBY INT’L, supra note 45, at 27
qstn. 28; 2005 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23 qstn. 10.
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Table 2:
State-by-State Public Opinion on Kelo
State
% Agreeing with Kelo

% Disagreeing

Connecticut52

8

88

Florida53

12

88

Kansas54

7

92

52. QUINNIPIAC UNIV. POLLING INST., QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY POLL:
CONNECTICUT VOTERS SAY 11-1 STOP EMINENT DOMAIN, qstn. 33 (2005),
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1296.xml?ReleaseID=821. Question wording: “As
you may know, the Court ruled that government can use eminent domain to
buy a person’s property and transfer it to private developers whose commercial projects could benefit the local economy. Do you agree or disagree with
this ruling? Do you agree/disagree strongly or somewhat?” Id.
53. MASON DIXON POLLING & RESEARCH INC., FLORIDA VOTERS OPPOSE
COURT DECISION ON EMINENT DOMAIN, STRONGLY SUPPORT STATE LAW TO
PROTECT PROPERTY RIGHTS 5 (2005), http://www.rg4rb.org/surveyEmDom
.html. Question wording:
In that Connecticut case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled government
can use the power of eminent domain to acquire a person’s property
and transfer it to private developers whose commercial projects could
benefit the local economy. Do you agree or disagree with this ruling?
(Is that strongly agree/disagree or somewhat agree/disagree?).
Id.
54. COLE HARGRAVE SNODGRASS & ASSOCS., A SURVEY OF 400 REGISTERED VOTERS IN KANSAS WITH A 200-SAMPLE SUBSET (2006), http://www
.castlecoalition.org/pdf/polls/amcns-prosp-poll-KS.pdf. Question wording:
For years, governments have used the power of eminent domain to
take control of private property and then use that property for
schools, hospitals, roads, parks and other public services. Recently,
the Kansas Supreme Court has expanded the government’s ability to
use eminent domain to include taking control of private property and
transferring it not for public services, but to other private interests
such as shopping centers or car lots. Do you favor or oppose the increased use of eminent domain to include taking private property and
transferring ownership to other private interests? (After response,
ask:) Would you say you strongly (favor/oppose) or only somewhat (favor/oppose)?
Id. (survey question wording on file with author).
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New Hampshire55

4

93

Minnesota56

5

91

North Carolina57

7

91

Pennsylvania58

9

90

Tennessee59

8

86
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Table 2 presents results for eight individual state surveys,
all of which are similar to the national data, with opposition to
Kelo ranging from 86 to 93 percent of respondents.60 The state
surveys each use different question wording and therefore are
55. UNIV. OF N.H. SURVEY CTR., THE GRANITE STATE POLL (2005),
http://www.unh.edu/survey-center/news/pdf/gsp2005_summer_sc072005.pdf.
Question wording:
Recently, the Supreme Court ruled that towns and cities may take
private land from people and make it available to businesses to develop under the principle of eminent domain. Some people favor this use
of eminent domain because it allows for increased tax revenues from
the new businesses and are an important part of economic redevelopment. Other people oppose this use of eminent domain because it
reduces the value of private property and makes it easier for big businesses to take land. What about you? Do you think that towns and cities should be allowed to take private land from the owners and make
it available to developers to develop or do you oppose this use of eminent domain?
Id.
56. DECISION RES. LTD., MINNESOTA AUTO DEALERS ASSOCIATION SURVEY (2006), http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/polls/Survey-for-Strib.pdf. Question wording: “What is your opinion–do you support allowing local governments to use eminent domain to take private property for another private
development project? Do you feel strongly this way?” Id.
57. JOHN WILLIAM POPE CIVITAS INST., JOHN WILLIAM POPE CIVITAS INSTITUTE SURVEY (2005), http://www.jwpcivitasinstitute.org/keylinks/poll_
august.html. Question wording: “The Supreme Court recently expanded the
power of government to take private property for non-public use. Do you agree
or disagree with this expansion of government’s right to take private property?” Id.
58. LINCOLN INST. OF PUB. OPINION RESEARCH, INC., KEYSTONE BUSINESS
CLIMATE SURVEY (2006), http://www.lincolninstitute.org/polls.php. Question
wording: “A recent U.S. Supreme Court decision upheld the taking of private
residential property by local municipalities to enable private developers to
build higher tax-yielding structures on that land. Do you agree or disagree
with this ruling?” Id.
59. SOC. SCI. RESEARCH INST. AT THE UNIV. OF TENN., KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE POLL 6 (2006), http://web.utk.edu/~ssriweb/National_Issues.pdf. Question wording: “Sometimes the property taken through eminent domain is given
to other private citizens for commercial development, rather than for public
uses, such as road or schools. Would you say you favor or oppose this use of
eminent domain?” Id.
60. See supra tbl.2.
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not completely comparable to the national surveys or to each
other. Nevertheless, the national and state by state survey results collectively paint a picture of widespread and overwhelming opposition to Kelo and economic development takings.
The broad anti-Kelo consensus among political leaders, activists, and the general public leads one to expect that the ruling would be followed by the enactment of legislation abolishing, or at least strictly limiting, economic-development takings.
Yet, as we shall see in Part II, such a result has not occurred in
most states.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
With some important exceptions, the legislative response
to Kelo has fallen short of expectations. At both the state and
federal level, most of the newly enacted laws are likely to impose few, if any, meaningful restrictions on economicdevelopment takings. This Part considers the effectiveness of
the state and federal legislative responses to Kelo. Legislative
reforms are classified as “effective” so long as they provide
property owners with at least some significant protection
against economic-development condemnations beyond that
available under preexisting law. Thus, even if the new law does
not categorically ban economic-development takings, it is still
considered “effective” if it forbids them in some range of cases.
For example, the Pennsylvania law is classified as effective despite the fact that it excludes, for a period of five years, condemnations occurring in that state’s most populous urban
areas.61 On the other hand, reform laws are classified as “ineffective” if they forbid economic-development condemnations but
essentially allow them to continue under another name, as in
the case of states with broad definitions of “blight” that allow
virtually any property to be declared blighted and condemned.62
A. STATE LAW
In analyzing the state law reforms enacted in the wake of
Kelo, it is important to recognize that there is a significant difference between laws enacted by referendum and those adopted
by state legislatures: the former are generally much stronger
61. For a discussion of this law, see infra notes 198–201 and accompanying text.
62. For an analysis of these types of ineffective laws, see infra Part
II.A.1.a.

2009]

POLITICAL RESPONSE TO KELO

2115

than the latter. Therefore, I analyze the two categories separately. The overall results of the analysis are summarized in
Table 3. Table 4 describes the effectiveness and type of reform
enacted in each state.
Table 3:
State Post-Kelo Reform Laws63
Type of Law

Effective

Enacted by Legislature
Citizen-initiated
Enacted by Referendum

Ineffective

Legislatureinitiated

Number of
States
14
4
2 or 3

Enacted by Legislature
Citizen-initiated

22
1

Enacted by Referendum

3 or 4

Legislatureinitiated

No Post-Kelo Reforms Enacted

664

Table 4:
Effectiveness of Reform by State
State
Effectiveness of Reform65
Alabama
Effective (L)
Alaska
Ineffective (L)
Arizona
Effective (CR)
Arkansas
No Reform
California
Ineffective (L)
Colorado
Ineffective (L)
Connecticut
Ineffective (L)
63. The total number of states listed adds up to more than forty-three because a few states had effective legislative reforms followed by ineffective legislative-referendum initiatives; such states are thus counted in both of those
categories. The state of Florida enacted legislative and referendum initiative
reforms that were both effective and is counted in both “effective” categories.
Nevada had an effective referendum initiative followed by an ineffective legislative reform.
64. This figure does not include the state of Utah, which abolished both
economic development and blight condemnations before Kelo. See infra note 81
and accompanying text. I do include the state of Washington, despite the fact
that it recently enacted a change in its eminent domain law unrelated to Kelo.
See infra Part II.A.1.b.vii.
65. As of January 2008. “L” refers to passed state legislation; “CR” refers
to passed citizen-initiated referenda; “LR” refers to passed legislature-initiated
referenda.
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Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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Ineffective (L)
Effective (L & LR)
Effective (L & LR)
No Reform
Effective (L)
Ineffective (L)
Effective (L)
Ineffective (L)
Effective (L)
Ineffective (L)
Effective (LR)
Ineffective (L)
Ineffective (L)
No Reform
Effective (L & LR)
Effective (L)
No Reform
Ineffective (L)
Ineffective (L)
Ineffective (L)
Effective (L & CR)
Effective (L & LR)
No Reform
Effective (L)
No Reform
Ineffective (L)
Effective (CR)
Ineffective (L)
No Reform
Effective (CR)
Effective (L)
Ineffective (L)
Ineffective (LR)
Effective (L)
Ineffective (L)
Ineffective (L)
Enacted Prior to Kelo
Ineffective (L)
Effective (L)
No Reform
Ineffective (L)
Ineffective (L)
Effective (L)

Table 5 shows that the enactment of effective post-Kelo
reform seems unrelated to the degree to which the state in
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question had previously engaged in private-to-private condemnation. That is, only seven of the twenty states with the greatest number of private-to-private takings between 1998 and
2002 have enacted effective post-Kelo reforms.
Table 5 is based on a study by the Institute for Justice, the
libertarian public interest law firm that represented the property owners in Kelo.66 The Institute for Justice figures are far
from definitive. They likely underestimate the prevalence of
condemnations for the benefit of private parties because they
were compiled from news reports and court filings.67 Many cases are unpublished, and many other condemnations go unreported in the press.68 Some of the condemnations in the study
involved the taking of multiple properties, sometimes hundreds
at a time, while others only applied to a small amount of land.69
Finally, the figures unfortunately do not separate economicdevelopment takings from other private-to-private condemnations. Nonetheless, they do give a rough indication of which
states engage in private-to-private condemnations more than
others. And it is noteworthy that states with a relatively large
number of private-to-private takings are less likely to have
enacted effective post-Kelo reforms than others.70
A similar picture emerges if we compare states with large
numbers of threatened private-to-private condemnations to
those with few, or if we analyze the data with respect to the
frequency of actual or threatened condemnations relative to the
size of the state’s population.71 In each case, states with relatively large numbers of actual or threatened condemnations
were not more likely to enact effective reforms than those with
few or none. Only seven of the twenty states with the most
threatened condemnations have enacted effective reforms.72
The same is true of just seven of the twenty states with the

66. See DANA BERLINER, INST. FOR JUSTICE, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE
GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2003), http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/report/ED_report.pdf.
Berliner was one of the two Institute for Justice lawyers who represented Susette Kelo and the other New London property owners. See Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469, at 469 (2005).
67. See BERLINER, supra note 66, at 2.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 3.
70. See infra tbl.5.
71. See infra tbls.A1–A3.
72. See infra tbl.A1.
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most private-to-private condemnations relative to population
size.73
Table 5:
Post-Kelo Reform in States Ranked by Number of Private-to-Private
Condemnations, 1998-2002
Effectiveness of Reform75
State
No. of
Takings74
Pennsylvania
2,517
Effective (L)
California
223
Ineffective (L)
Kansas
155
Effective (L)
Michigan
138
Effective (L & LR)
Maryland
127
Ineffective (L)
Ohio
90
Ineffective (L)
Florida
67
Effective (L & LR)
Virginia
58
Effective (L)
New York
57
No Reform
New Jersey
51
No Reform
Connecticut
31
Ineffective (L)
Tennessee
29
Ineffective (L)
Colorado
23
Ineffective (L)
Oklahoma
23
No Reform
Missouri
18
Ineffective (L)
Rhode Island
12
Ineffective (L)
Arizona
11
Effective (CR)
Texas
11
Ineffective (L)
Washington
11
No Reform
Minnesota
9
Effective (L)
Alabama
8
Effective (L)
Illinois
8
Ineffective (L)
West Virginia
8
Ineffective (L)
Kentucky
7
Ineffective (L)
Louisiana
5
Effective (LR)
Massachusetts
5
No Reform
Indiana
4
Effective (L)
Iowa
4
Ineffective (L)
Mississippi
3
No Reform
Nevada
3
Effective (L & CR)
Maine
2
Ineffective (L)
Arkansas
1
No Reform
Nebraska
1
Ineffective (L)
North Carolina
1
Ineffective (L)
North Dakota
1
Effective (CR)
73. See infra tbl.A2.
74. Some takings affected more than one property.
75. As of January, 2009.
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Alaska
Delaware
Georgia
Idaho
South Dakota
Wyoming
Hawaii
Montana
New Hampshire
New Mexico
Oregon
South Carolina
Utah
Vermont
Wisconsin

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Ineffective (L)
Ineffective (L)
Effective (L & LR)
Effective (L)
Effective (L)
Effective (L)
No Reform
Ineffective (L)
Effective (L & LR)
Effective (L)
Effective (CR)
Ineffective (LR)
Enacted Prior to Kelo
Ineffective (L)
Ineffective (L)

To be sure, three of the four states with the largest number
of takings—Pennsylvania, Kansas, and Michigan—have
enacted effective reforms. However, the significance of this fact
is diminished by the reality that Pennsylvania’s reform law has
a major loophole exempting those parts of the state where most
condemnations occur.76 Michigan’s reform law, while quite
strong,77 came on the heels of a state supreme court decision
that had already banned Kelo-style economic development takings.78
In addition, the Institute for Justice figures are only approximate, and it is likely that they underestimate the number
of economic-development condemnations in some states.79 It is
therefore difficult to know whether Pennsylvania, Kansas, and
Michigan really were three of the top four states in this category. Furthermore, it would be unwise to draw broad conclusions
from just three cases, especially in light of the fact that nearly
all the other states with large numbers of private-to-private
takings in the Institute for Justice study either enacted ineffec-

76. See infra notes 192–196 and accompanying text.
77. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
78. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 784 (Mich. 2004).
For an analysis of Hathcock, see Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of
Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, and the Future of Public
Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005. The new Michigan law does, however, go
beyond Hathcock in limiting blight condemnations that might not have been
prevented by the court decision. See id. at 1033–39.
79. See, for example, infra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the underestimation of the number of takings in Minnesota.
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tive reforms or none at all.80 For these reasons, the reforms in
these states are not compelling evidence for the theory that the
effectiveness of post-Kelo reform was driven by the extent to
which the state in question made use of economic development
condemnations prior to Kelo.
1. Reforms Enacted by State Legislatures
As of early 2009, thirty-six state legislatures have enacted
post-Kelo reforms. The state of Utah effectively banned economic development takings in a statute enacted several months before Kelo was decided by the Supreme Court.81 However, twenty-two of the thirty-six new state laws provide little or no
protection for property owners against economic development
takings. Only fourteen state legislatures have enacted laws
that either ban economic development takings or significantly
restrict them. The seventeen ineffective state laws are of several types. By far the most common are laws that forbid takings
for economic development but in fact allow them to continue
under another name, such as “blight” or “community development” condemnations. Other post-Kelo reforms lack teeth because they either forbid only those takings that are for “private” development (thus permitting localities to condemn under
the standard theory that any such takings are really intended
to promote “public” benefits) or are purely symbolic in nature.
a. Laws with Broad Exemptions for Blight Condemnations
Sixteen states have enacted post-Kelo reform laws whose
effect is largely negated by exemptions for blight condemnations under definitions of blight that make it possible to include
almost any property in that category. This is by far the most
common factor undermining the potential effectiveness of postKelo reform laws.
Early blight cases in the 1940s and 1950s upheld condemnations in areas that fit the layperson’s intuitive notion of
blight: dilapidated, dangerous, or disease-ridden neighborhoods. For example, in Berman v. Parker, the well-known 1954
80. See supra tbl.5.
81. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-4 -202 (2004) (current version at UTAH
CODE ANN. § 17C-1-202 (2006)); see also Henry Lamb, Utah Bans Eminent
Domain Use by Redevelopment Agencies, 8 ENV’T & CLIMATE NEWS, June
2005, at 1 (describing the politics behind the Utah law). In March 2006, Utah
partially rescinded its ban on blight condemnations. See UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 17C-2-503 (amended 2007).
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case in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of blight condemnations under the Federal Public Use Clause,
the condemned neighborhood was characterized by “[m]iserable
and disreputable housing conditions.”82 According to the Court,
“64.3% of the dwellings [in the area] were beyond repair, 18.4%
needed major repairs, only 17.3% were satisfactory; 57.8% of
the dwellings had outside toilets, 60.3% had no baths, 29.3%
lacked electricity, 82.2% had no wash basins or laundry tubs,
[and] 83.8% lacked central heating.”83
More recently, however, many states have expanded the
concept of blight to encompass almost any area where economic
development could potentially be increased. For example, recent state appellate court decisions have held that Times
Square in New York City,84 and downtown Las Vegas85 are
blighted, thereby justifying condemnations undertaken to acquire land for a new headquarters for the New York Times and
parking lots for a consortium of local casinos, respectively. All
but three states permit condemnation for blight and most of
these define the concept broadly.86 For decades, courts have interpreted broad definitions of blight in ways that allow the condemnation of almost any property; if virtually any property can
be condemned as blighted, a ban on economic development takings would be essentially irrelevant.87
Sixteen post-Kelo reform laws continue this pattern, using
definitions of blight that are either identical to those enshrined
in preexisting law or very similar to them. These reform laws
thereby undermine the effectiveness of their bans on private-toprivate condemnations for economic development. Ten of these
82. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
83. Id.
84. In re W. 41st St. Realty v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 744 N.Y.S.2d
121, 125–26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
85. City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 12–
15 (Nev. 2003).
86. See generally Hudson Hayes Luce, The Meaning of Blight: A Survey of
Statutory and Case Law, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 389, 394 –96 (2000)
(describing definitions of blight used in various states). This article is slightly
out-of-date because it does not account for the abolition of blight condemnations by Florida, New Mexico, and Utah, as well as the tightening of the definition of blight by other states in the aftermath of Kelo. See infra notes 175–
178 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relevant laws; see also Colin
Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the
Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 305–07 (2004) (describing very broad use of blight designations to facilitate condemnation).
87. See Gordon, supra note 86, at 320–23; Luce, supra note 86, at 397–
400.
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followed a standard pattern of defining blight as any obstacle to
“sound growth” or an “economic or social liability.” Six have
somewhat more idiosyncratic but comparably broad definitions
of blight.
i. Defining Blight to Include Any Obstacle to “Sound
Growth” or an “Economic or Social Liability”
Ten state Post-Kelo, laws leave in place definitions of
blight that include any area where there are obstacles to
“sound growth” or conditions that constitute an “economic or
social liability.” These include reform laws in Alaska,88 Colorado,89 Missouri,90 Montana,91 Nebraska,92 North Carolina,93
88. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.240(a)(2) (2008) (exempting preexisting public
uses declared in state law from a ban on economic development takings); Id.
§ 18.55.950(2) (“‘[B]lighted area’ means an area, other than a slum area, that
by reason of the predominance of defective or inadequate street layout, faulty
lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, accessibility, or usefulness, unsanitary
or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site or improvements, tax or special assessment delinquency exceeding the fair value of the land, improper subdivision or obsolete platting, or the existence of conditions that endanger life or
property by fire and other causes, or any combination of these factors, substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of the municipality, retards the
provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its
condition and use.”).
89. COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-25-103(2) (2008) (defining “blight” to include
any condition that “substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of the
municipality, retards the provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes
an economic or social liability, and is a menace to the public health, safety,
morals, or welfare”); Id. § 38-1-101(2)(b) (allowing condemnation for the “eradication of blight”).
90. MO. REV. STAT. § 100.310.2 (2008) (defining “blighted area” as “an
area which, by reason of the predominance of defective or inadequate street
layout, insanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site improvements,
improper subdivision or obsolete platting, or the existence of conditions which
endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or any combination of such
factors, retards the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an
economic or social liability or a menace to the public health, safety, morals or
welfare”); Id. § 353.020.2 (defining “blighted area” as “that portion of the
city . . . that by reason of age, obsolescence, inadequate or outmoded design or
physical deterioration have become economic and social liabilities, and that
such conditions are conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, crime or
inability to pay reasonable taxes”); id. § 523.271.2 (exempting blight condemnations from ban on “economic development” takings). A recent Missouri Supreme Court decision has construed section 353.020 as requiring separate
proof of “social liability” that goes beyond merely showing the existence of an
“economic liability,” in the sense of an obstacle to future growth and reduction
of tax revenue. See Centene Plaza Redev. Corp. v. Mint Prop., 225 S.W.3d 431,
433 (Mo. 2007). The decision notes, however, that proof of the existence of “social liability” might be demonstrated by providing evidence “concerning the
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Ohio,94 Texas,95 Vermont,96 and West Virginia.97 Obviously, any
public health, safety, and welfare,” which in this case was totally absent in the
record. Id. at 433–35. In any event, Missouri local governments also have the
power to condemn property based on the definition of blight in another statute
that defines the concept as requiring proof of the existence of either an “economic” or a “social liability.” See State ex rel. Atkinson v. Planned Indus. Expansion Auth., 517 S.W.2d 36, 41 (Mo. 1975) (noting that industrial development projects undertaken in accordance with this section include the power to
acquire property through the use of eminent domain).
91. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 7-15-4206(2) (2007) (“‘Blighted area’ means an
area that is conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, infant mortality,
juvenile delinquency, and crime, that substantially impairs or arrests the
sound growth of the city or its environs, that retards the provision of housing
accommodations, or that constitutes an economic or social liability or is detrimental or constitutes a menace to the public health, safety, welfare, and morals in its present condition and use by reason of: (a) the substantial physical
dilapidation, deterioration, age obsolescence, or defective construction, material, and arrangement of buildings or improvements, whether residential or
nonresidential.”); id. § 70-30-102 (banning economic development condemnations, but retaining most of the broad definition of blight outlined in section 715-4206(2)(a)).
92. NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-2103 (2007) (defining blight as any area in a
condition that “substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of the community, retards the provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes an
economic or social liability” and has “deteriorating” structures); id. § 76-701
(exempting “blight” condemnations from ban on economic development takings).
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-503(2) (2007) (“‘Blighted area’ shall mean an
area in which there is a predominance of buildings or improvements (or which
is predominantly residential in character), and which, by reason of dilapidation, deterioration, age or obsolescence, inadequate provision for ventilation,
light, air, sanitation, or open spaces, high density of population and overcrowding, unsanitary or unsafe conditions, or the existence of conditions which
endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or any combination of such
factors, substantially impairs the sound growth of the community, is conducive
to ill health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency
and crime, and is detrimental to the public health, safety, morals or welfare.”);
id. § 160A-515 (exempting blight condemnations from restrictions on economic
development takings).
94. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1.08, 303.26(E) (LexisNexis 2008) (“‘Blighted
area’ and ‘slum’ mean an area in which at least seventy per cent of the parcels
are blighted parcels and those blighted parcels substantially impair or arrest
the sound growth of the state or a political subdivision of the state, retard the
provision of housing accommodations, constitute an economic or social liability, or are a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare . . . .”). To
qualify as a “blighted parcel,” a parcel must meet at least two of seventeen vague and general conditions such as “deterioration,” “age and obsolescence,”
“faulty lot layout,” being “located in an area of defective or inadequate street
layout,” and “overcrowding of buildings.” Id. § 108.(B)(2)(a-p). Virtually any
area is likely to meet two or more of these criteria. See also S.B. 167, § 2(A),
126th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2005) (exempting blight condemnations from temporary moratorium on economic development takings).
95. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001(b)(3) (Vernon 2008) (exempting
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obstacle to economic development can easily be defined as impairing “sound growth,” making this definition of blight broad
enough to justify virtually any condemnation under an economic development rationale. Similarly, an impediment to economic
development can be considered an “economic or social liability.”
Several of the state laws listed above require that, in order to
be blighted, an area that is an “economic or social liability”
must also be “a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or
welfare.”98 This additional condition is unlikely to be a significant constraint because almost any condition that impedes economic development could be considered a “menace to the public . . . welfare.”
For example, under Florida’s pre-reform blight statute,
which used this exact wording, the Florida Supreme Court
found that even undeveloped land could be considered
“blighted” if its current state impedes future development.99
The Supreme Court of Arizona has similarly described this language—which was present in Arizona’s pre-Kelo blight statute—as an “extremely broad definition of . . . ‘blighted area’”
that gives condemning authorities “wide discretion in deciding
what constitutes blight.”100 Significantly, searches on Westlaw
and Lexis do not reveal any published state court opinions that
condemnations “to eliminate an existing affirmative harm on society from
slum or blighted areas” from the ban on economic development takings); TEX.
LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 374.003(3) (Vernon 2005) (“‘Blighted area’ means an
area that is not a slum area, but that, because of deteriorating buildings,
structures, or other improvements; defective or inadequate streets, street
layout, or accessibility; unsanitary conditions; or other hazardous conditions,
adversely affects the public health, safety, morals, or welfare . . . or results in
an economic or social liability to the municipality.”).
96. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1040 (2008) (exempting blight condemnations
from ban on economic development takings); Id. tit. 24, § 3201(3) (defining
“blighted area” to include any planning or layout condition that “substantially
impairs or arrests the sound growth of a municipality, retards the provision of
housing accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a
menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare”).
97. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-18-3 (LexisNexis 2006) (defining “blighted
area” as an area which, due to a number of factors such as deterioration or inadequate street layout, “substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of
the community, retards the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its present condition and use”); Id. § 16-18-6 (exempting blight condemnation from ban on redevelopment takings).
98. See supra notes 88–97.
99. Panama City Beach Cmty. Redev. Agency v. State, 831 So. 2d 662,
668–69 (Fla. 2002).
100. City of Phoenix v. Superior Ct., 671 P.2d 387, 391–93 (Ariz. 1983).
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interpret this language as a meaningful constraint on the scope
of blight condemnations. There are no published court decisions
using it to strike down an attempted blight taking of any
kind.101
ii. Other Broad Blight Exemptions
Eight other states have similarly broad blight exemptions,
albeit with different wording. Illinois’ new law exempts blight
condemnations from its ban on economic development takings
and retains its preexisting definition of blight,102 which defined
a blighted area as one where “industrial, commercial, and residential buildings or improvements are detrimental to the public
safety, health, or welfare because of a combination of 5 or more
of the following factors.”103 The list of factors include dilapidation; obsolescence; deterioration; below minimum code standards; illegal use of structures; excessive vacancies; lack of ventilation, light, or sanitary facilities; inadequate utilities;
excessive land coverage and overcrowding of structures and
community facilities; deleterious land use or layout; environmental clean-up; lack of community planning; or an assessed
value that has declined three of the last five years.104 The concept of “detriment” to “public welfare” is extremely broad and
surely includes detriment to local economic welfare and development. The list of factors includes numerous conditions, such
as deterioration, “deleterious land use or layout,” lack of community planning, a declining assessed value, “excessive” land
coverage, and obsolescence—that exist to some degree in most
communities.105 Thus, the Illinois law would forbid few if any
economic development takings.
The new Nevada statute bans all private-to-private condemnations,106 but leaves open an exception for blight takings.107 Current Nevada law defines blight very broadly, allowing an area to be declared blighted so long as it meets at least

101. As far as I am aware, there are no unpublished decisions with such a
holding.
102. S.B. 3086, 94th Gen. Assem., § 1-1-5 (Ill. 2006).
103. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-74.4 -3(a)(1) (2006).
104. Id.
105. The statute does require that at least five of the listed factors be
present. Id. However, this is little obstacle to obtaining a blight declaration
because so many are conditions that exist in almost any area.
106. NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.010(1)(q) (2007).
107. Id.
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four of eleven factors.108 The possible factors include at least six
that are extremely broad and could apply to almost any area:
“economic dislocation, deterioration or disuse,” “subdividing
and sale of lots of irregular form and shape and inadequate size
for proper usefulness and development,” “[t]he laying out of lots
in disregard of the contours and other physical characteristics
of the ground,” “[t]he existence of inadequate streets, open
spaces and utilities,” “[a] growing or total lack of proper utilization of some parts of the area, resulting in a stagnant and unproductive condition of land,” and “[a] loss of population and a
reduction of proper use of some parts of the area, resulting in
its further deterioration and added costs to the taxpayer . . . .”109 In 2003, the Nevada Supreme Court used this statute to declare downtown Las Vegas a blighted area, thereby
justifying the condemnation of property for transfer to several
casinos so that they could build new parking facilities for their
customers.110 However, the Nevada statute was enacted in the
aftermath of a referendum that approved a state constitutional
amendment that will eventually provide much stronger protection for property owners than permitted under the legislative
statute.111
Kentucky’s post-Kelo reform law likewise retains a very
broad preexisting definition of blight.112 The law allows condemnation of property for “urban renewal and community development” in “blighted” or “slum” areas.113 An area can be considered “blighted” or a “slum” if there are flaws in the “size” or
“usefulness” of property lots in the area, or if there are conditions “constitut[ing] a menace to the public health, safety and
welfare.”114
Maine’s reform statute also incorporates a broad definition
of blight from prior legislation.115 Prior Maine law defined
108. Id. § 279.388.
109. Id.
110. City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 12–
15 (Nev. 2003). However, it should be noted that the 2003 version of section
279.388 required the presence of only one of the eleven factors to allow an area
to be declared “blighted.” Id. at 6 n.8.
111. See infra Part II.A.3 for a discussion of Nevada’s referendum initiative.
112. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 99.340(2) (LexisNexis 2004).
113. Id. § 99.370(6).
114. Id. § 99.340.
115. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 5101 (1964); see also id. tit. 1, § 816
(2008) (exempting blight condemnations from ban on economic development
condemnations).
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blight as including areas in which properties suffer from
“[d]ilapidation, deterioration, age or obsolescence.”116 For condemnations that further “urban renewal” projects, detriment to
“public health, safety, morals or welfare” may lead to a blight
designation.117 Condemnation for “community development”
can occur in areas that are considered blighted under the same
definition, except that threats to “morals” are not included.118
The new Tennessee law attempts to tighten the definition
of “blight,” but ultimately leaves it very broad. Under the new
statute:
“Blighted areas” are areas (including slum areas) with buildings or
improvements which, by reason of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, lack of ventilation, light and sanitary facilities, deleterious
land use, or any combination of these or other factors, are detrimental
to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the community. Welfare of
the community does not include solely a loss of property value to surrounding properties nor does it include the need for increased tax revenues.119

The inclusion of the term “welfare of the community”
seems to leave the door open to most economic development
takings; after all, economic development is generally considered
a component of community “welfare.” This conclusion is not
much affected by the stipulation that “‘[w]elfare of the community’ . . . does not include solely a loss of property value to surrounding properties nor does it include the need for increased
tax revenues.”120 Condemnations that promote “development”
by increasing property values are still permitted so long as
there is some other claim of even a small economic benefit, such
as an increase in employment, savings, or investment. Indeed,
the provision of jobs and attraction of outside investors is a
standard rationale for economic development condemnations.121
Rhode Island’s reform law is the last post-Kelo law enacted
to date.122 It mandates that “[n]o entity subject to the provi116. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 5101 (1964).
117. Id. § 5102.
118. Id. § 5201.
119. TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (2008).
120. Id.
121. The best-known case is Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock,
684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004), where some 4000 were uprooted in order to provide a site for a new General Motors factory in Detroit that was expected to
create 6000 new jobs. Id. n.15 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). For discussion, see
generally Somin, supra note 78.
122. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-64.12-1 (Supp. 2008).
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sions of the chapter shall exercise eminent powers to acquire
any property for economic development purposes unless it has
explicit authority to do so and unless it conforms to the provisions of this section.”123 The requirement of having “explicit authority” is not a meaningful constraint because state law already gives virtually all local government the power to
condemn property in “arrested blighted areas,” “deteriorated
blighted areas,” and “slum blighted areas.”124 All three of these
concepts are defined extremely broadly.125 The new Rhode Isl123. Id. § 42-64.12-7.
124. Id. § 45-31-6 (1999).
125. Id. § 45-31-8. An “arrested blighted area” is defined as:
[A]ny area which, by reason of the existence of physical conditions including, but not by way of limitation, the existence of unsuitable soil
conditions, the existence of dumping or other insanitary or unsafe
conditions, the existence of ledge or rock, the necessity of unduly expensive excavation, fill or grading, or the necessity of undertaking
unduly expensive measures for the drainage of the area or for the
prevention of flooding or for making the area appropriate for sound
development, or by reason of obsolete, inappropriate, or otherwise
faulty platting or subdivision, deterioration of site improvements, inadequacy of utilities, diversity of ownership of plots, or tax delinquencies, or by reason of any combination of any of the foregoing conditions, is unduly costly to develop soundly through the ordinary
operations of private enterprise and impairs the sound growth of the
community.
Id. § 45-31-8(2). A “deteriorated blighted area” is:
[A]ny area in which there exist buildings or improvements, either
used or intended to be used for living, commercial, industrial, or other
purposes, or any combination of these uses, which by reason of:
(i) Dilapidation, deterioration, age, or obsolescence;
(ii) Inadequate provision for ventilation, light, sanitation, open
spaces, and recreation facilities;
(iii) High density of population and overcrowding,
(iv) Defective design or unsanitary or unsafe character or conditions of physical construction;
(v) Defective or inadequate street and lot layout; and
(vi) Mixed character, shifting, or deterioration of uses to which
they are put, or any combination of these factors and characteristics,
are conducive to the further deterioration and decline of the area to
the point where it may become a slum blighted area as defined in
subdivision (18), and are detrimental to the public health, safety,
morals, and welfare of the inhabitants of the community and of the
state generally. A deteriorated blighted area need not be restricted to,
or consist entirely of, lands, buildings, or improvements which of
themselves are detrimental or inimical to the public health, safety,
morals, or welfare, but may consist of an area in which these conditions exist and injuriously affect the entire area.
Id. § 45-31-8(6). Finally, a “slum blighted area” is:
[A]ny area in which there is a predominance of buildings or improvements, either used or intended to be used for living, commercial, industrial, or other purposes, or any combination of these uses, which
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and reform law explicitly reaffirms the power of local redevelopment agencies to condemn property under these blight statutes.126 Indeed, the new law may actually increase the power
of redevelopment agencies to condemn property, because it allows them to take any property for the purposes of “correcting
conditions adversely affecting public health, safety, morals, or
welfare,” and this authorization is “not limited to” areas that
have been declared blighted.127
Iowa’s and Wisconsin’s post-Kelo laws are somewhat ambiguous cases, though tending toward a broad definition of blight.
The Iowa statute includes a less broad blight exemption but
one that might still be extensive enough to allow a wide range
of economic development takings. The Iowa statute permits
condemnation of blighted areas, and defines blight as:
[T]he presence of a substantial number of slum or deteriorated structures; insanitary or unsafe conditions; excessive and uncorrected deterioration of site or other improvements; tax or special assessment
delinquency exceeding the fair value of the land; defective or unusual
conditions of title; or the existence of conditions which endanger life
or property by fire and other causes; or the existence of conditions
which retard the provision of housing accommodations for low or

by reason of:
(i) dilapidation, deterioration, age, or obsolescence;
(ii) inadequate provision for ventilation, light, sanitation, open
spaces, and recreation facilities;
(iii) high density of population and overcrowding;
(iv) defective design or unsanitary or unsafe character or condition of physical construction;
(v) defective or inadequate street and lot layout; and
(vi) mixed character or shifting of uses to which they are put, or
any combination of these factors and characteristics, are conducive to
ill health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency, and crime; injuriously affect the entire area and constitute a
menace to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare of the inhabitants of the community and of the state generally. A slum blighted
area need not be restricted to, or consist entirely of, lands, buildings,
or improvements which of themselves are detrimental or inimical to
the public health, safety, morals, or welfare, but may consist of an
area in which these conditions predominate and injuriously affect the
entire area.
Id. § 45-31-8(18).
126. Id. § 42-64.12-6(d) (Supp. 2008) (noting the power to condemn property in order to “[e]liminat[e] an identifiable public harm and/or correct[ ] conditions adversely affecting public health, safety, morals, or welfare, including,
but not limited to, the elimination and prevention of blighted and substandard
areas, as defined by chapter 45-31”).
127. Id.
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moderate income families, or is a menace to the public health and
safety in its present condition and use.128

Whether or not this is a broad definition of blight depends
on the definition of such terms as “deteriorated structures” and
“excessive and uncorrected deterioration of site.” If the concept
of “deterioration” is defined broadly, then virtually any area
could be considered blighted because all structures gradually
deteriorate over time. Since one of the conditions justifying a
blight designation is “the presence of a substantial number of
slum or deteriorated structures,”129 we might presume that the
term “deteriorated” can be applied to structures that are not dilapidated enough to be considered “slum[s].” Otherwise, the inclusion of the term “deteriorated” would be superfluous. Thus,
it is possible that courts will interpret the Iowa statute to permit a very broad definition of blight by virtue of the use of the
term “deteriorated.”
In addition, it is possible that a wide range of areas could
be considered blighted by applying the statute’s provision that
an area is blighted if there are “conditions which retard the
provision of housing accommodations for low or moderate income families.”130 Since the law does not state that the “retardation” must be of significant magnitude, it is possible that the
existence of conditions that impair the provision of low and
moderate income housing even slightly might be enough to justify a blight designation.
The Wisconsin statute is more restrictive than Iowa’s. It
too exempts blight condemnations from its ban on economic development takings and defines blight broadly. The definition
includes:
[A]ny property that, by reason of abandonment, dilapidation, deterioration, age or obsolescence, inadequate provisions for ventilation,
light, air, or sanitation, high density of population and overcrowding,
faulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, accessibility, or usefulness, unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site or other
improvements, or the existence of conditions that endanger life or
property by fire or other causes, or any combination of such factors, is
detrimental to the public health, safety, or welfare.131

However, the statute also exempts residential property
consisting of a single dwelling unit from condemnation for
blight alleviation unless it has: 1) “been abandoned” or 2) “the
128.
129.
130.
131.

IOWA CODE § 6A.22 (2008).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
WIS. STAT. § 32.03(6)(a) (2007–08).
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crime rate in [or near] the property is at least 3 times the crime
rate in the remainder of the municipality.”132 Thus, the Wisconsin law provides considerable protection for single-family
homes, but allows nonresidential properties and many multifamily homes to be condemned under a broad definition of
blight.
b. State Laws that Are Ineffective for Other Reasons133
While broad blight exemptions are by far the most common
type of loophole in post-Kelo laws, several post-Kelo statutes
are ineffective for other reasons. The most notable of these are
those of California, Connecticut, Maryland, and Delaware. The
Texas and Ohio laws, already briefly discussed above, also have
major loopholes besides those created by their blight exemptions. Each of these situations is analyzed below. I also briefly
consider Washington’s new eminent domain law, even though
the latter is not truly a response to Kelo.
i.

California

In September 2006, the California state legislature enacted
a package of five post-Kelo eminent domain reform bills.134
None of the five even comes close to forbidding condemnations
for economic development. Four of the five laws create minor
new procedural hurdles for local governments seeking to condemn property.135 As eminent domain scholar and litigator Timothy Sandefur has shown in a detailed analysis, none of the
laws impose restrictions that will significantly impede the exercise of eminent domain in California.136
Senate Bill 1206 attempts to narrow the definition of
blight, but still leaves it broad enough to permit the condemnation of almost any property that local governments might want
to take for economic development purposes. The bill requires
that a blighted area have both at least one “physical condition”
that causes blight and one “economic” condition.137 Both lists of
132. Id.
133. The analysis of the Delaware, Ohio, and Texas laws is in large part
derived from Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 15, at 245–52.
134. See S.53, 1206, 1210, 1650, 1809, 2006 Leg. (Cal. 2006).
135. See S.53, 1210, 1650, 1809, 2006 Leg. (Cal. 2006).
136. See Timothy Sandefur, PLF on Eminent Domain, Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Mealy-Mouthed Property Rights Protection, Sept. 29, 2006,
http://eminentdomain.typepad.com/my_weblog/2006/09/gov_schwarzeneg
.html.
137. S.1206 § 2(b)(2) (requiring that blighted areas meet physical and eco-
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qualifying conditions include vague criteria that could apply to
almost any neighborhood. The list of “physical conditions” includes “conditions that prevent or substantially hinder the viable use or capacity of buildings or lots,” and “[a]djacent or nearby incompatible land uses that prevent the development of
those parcels or other portions of the project area.”138 Since “viable use” and “development” are left undefined, local officials
will have broad discretion to designate areas as they see fit.
The list of “economic conditions” is similar. Among other
things, it includes “[d]epreciated or stagnant property values,”
“[a]bnormally high business vacancies,” and “abnormally low
lease rates.”139 Since almost any area occasionally experiences
stagnation or decline in property values and a declining business climate, this list too puts no meaningful restrictions on
blight designations. Moreover, it is important to remember that
a blight condemnation requires just one condition from each
list, further increasing official discretion.
ii. Connecticut
The new Connecticut law merely forbids the condemnation
of property “for the primary purpose of increasing local tax revenue.”140 This restriction does not prevent condemnations for
either economic development or blight purposes. Connecticut
law allows local governments to condemn property for both
economic development purposes and to alleviate blight-like
conditions.141 Even the goal of increasing tax revenue can still
be pursued so long as it is part of a more general plan for local
“redevelopment.”142 In practice, it is likely impossible to prove
nomic conditions defined in section 3).
138. Id. § 3.
139. Id.
140. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-193(b)(1) (2009).
141. See generally id. § 8-124 (allowing use of eminent domain by redevelopment agencies); id. § 8-125(2) (stating that “redevelopment areas” can be
declared in any “area within the state that is deteriorated, deteriorating, substandard or detrimental to the safety, health, morals or welfare of the community”). The concept of “deteriorating” area is defined extremely broadly. Id. § 8125(7) (providing a list of numerous conditions only one of which must be met
for an area to qualify as “deteriorating.” Even this list is not exhaustive, since
the statute says that possible conditions qualifying an area as “deteriorating”
are “not limited” to those enumerated). See also Kelo v. City of New London,
545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005) (noting that Connecticut law permitted condemnation
of the New London properties despite the fact that they were not “blighted”
and only because they were located in the development area.
142. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-125 to -133 (2009) (outlining procedures for
condemning property in “redevelopment areas”).
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that a given property is being condemned primarily for the
purpose of “increasing local tax revenue” as distinct from the
goal of promoting economic development more generally. It is
ironic that the state in which the Kelo case originated has
enacted one of the nation’s weakest post-Kelo reform laws, one
that would not have prevented the condemnations challenged
by Susette Kelo and her fellow New London property owners.
iii. Delaware
The Delaware bill is arguably the least effective of all the
post-Kelo laws enacted so far.143 It does not restrict condemnations for economic development at all. The statute requires
merely that the power of eminent domain only be exercised for
“the purposes of a recognized public use as described at least 6
months in advance of the institution of condemnation proceedings: (a) In a certified planning document; (b) At a public hearing held specifically to address the acquisition; or (c) In a published report of the acquiring agency.”144 This bill does little
more than restate current constitutional law, which already requires that condemnation be for a “recognized public use.”145
Indeed, the Kelo majority notes that “‘purely private taking[s]’”
are constitutionally forbidden.146 The real question, however, is
what counts as a “recognized public use,” and this issue is in no
way addressed by the new Delaware law.
The requirement that the purpose of the condemnation be
announced six months in advance provides a minor procedural
protection for property owners, but one that can easily be circumvented simply by tucking away the required announcement
in “a “published report of the acquiring agency.”147

143. Just as this article went to press, the Delaware state legislature
enacted a new reform law that seems to provide much stronger protection for
property owners against blight and economic development takings. See Del.
Sen. Bill 7 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9501A) (signed into law Apr.
9, 2009), available at http://legis.delaware.gov/LIS/LIS145.NSF/vwLegislation/
SB+7?Opendocument. Unfortunately time constraints make it impossible to
analyze the new law here.
144. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 9505(15) (Supp. 2008).
145. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472.
146. Id. at 477 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 241, 245
(1984)).
147. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 39 § 9505(15).
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iv. Maryland
Maryland’s new law does not forbid condemnations for either economic development or blight. Instead, it merely requires a condemnation to occur within four years of its authorization.148 This restriction is unlikely to impede economic
development takings. Not only is the four year period quite
long, but reauthorization is likely to be easily obtained under
the state’s extremely broad definition of “blighted” and “slum”
areas, both of which are eligible for condemnation under Maryland law.149
v. Ohio
The main shortcoming of the Ohio law is its temporary nature. The new law mandated that:
[U]ntil December 31, 2006, no public body shall use eminent domain
to take . . . private property that is not within a blighted area, as determined by the public body, when the primary purpose for the taking
is economic development that will ultimately result in ownership of
that property being vested in another private person.”150

Even within the short period of its effect, the law probably
only had a very limited impact. While it forbade condemnations
where economic development was the “primary purpose,” nothing prevented such takings if the community could cite some
other objective to which the development objective was an adjunct or complement.151 Creative local governments could easily
come up with such proposals. Furthermore, the Ohio law explicitly exempted blighted areas from its scope;152 the definition of
blight under Ohio law is broad enough to cover almost any

148. See MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. § 12-105.1(a) (West 2007).
149. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 61. The Maryland Constitution allows the
use of eminent domain in “slum or blighted areas” and defines these terms as
follows:
The term “slum area” shall mean any area where dwellings predominate which, by reason of depreciation, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, lack of ventilation, light or sanitary facilities, or any
combination of these factors, are detrimental to the public safety,
health or morals. The term “blighted area” shall mean an area in
which a majority of buildings have declined in productivity by reason
of obsolescence, depreciation or other causes to an extent they no
longer justify fundamental repairs and adequate maintenance.
150. An Act to Establish a Moratorium on Eminent Domain, S.B. 167 § 2,
Oh. Gen. Assem. (Oh. 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1426 (LexisNexis 2005 Bulletin #5)).
151. Id.
152. Id.
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area.153 Finally, given the temporary nature of the legislation, a
local government could get around it simply by postponing a
given condemnation project for a few months.
The Ohio legislation also established a “Legislative Task
Force to Study Eminent Domain and its Use and Application in
the State.”154 However, the twenty-five member commission
was largely dominated by pro-eminent domain interests. Fourteen of the twenty-five members were required to be representatives of groups that tend to be supportive of broad eminent
domain power. Only four were required to be members of
groups likely to support strict limits on condemnation authority, and seven represented groups with mixed incentives.155 As
was perhaps to be expected, the Commission’s Final Report
recommended only minor reforms in state law. For example, it
recommended tightening the state’s broad definition of blight,
but its proposed new definition is almost as broad as the old
one.156 In July 2007, the Ohio state legislature enacted a new
reform law that adopted the definition of blight recommended
by the Commission.157 That definition, however, provides little
if any new protection for property owners.158
vi. Texas
Texas’ post-Kelo legislation is likely to be almost completely ineffectual because of its major loopholes. It forbids condem153. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 303.26(E) (LexisNexis 2003) (defining
blight to include deteriorating structures or where the site “substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of a county, retards the provision of housing
accommodations, or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a menace
to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare”).
154. An Act to Establish a Moratorium on Eminent Domain, S.B. 167 § 3,
Oh. Gen. Assem. (Oh. 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 1426 (LexisNexis 2005 Bulletin #5)).
155. For a detailed analysis of the Commission’s composition, see Somin,
Grasping Hand, supra note 15, at 249.
156. See FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE TO STUDY EMINENT DOMAIN
12, Aug. 1, 2006 (on file with author). The new definition of blight advocated
by the Commission would allow the designation of an area as “blighted” so
long as it was characterized by any two of seventeen different conditions. Id.
Attachment 2. Many of these are vaguely defined and could apply to almost
any property. For example, one of the seventeen conditions is “[f ]aulty lot
layout in relation to size, adequacy, accessibility, or usefulness.” Id. Others
include “[e]xcessive dwelling unit density” (without defining what constitutes
“excessive”), and “[a]ge and obsolescence” (also undefined). Id. Like the old definition, the new one would still permit virtually any property to be designated
as “blighted.” For the old definition, see supra note 153.
157. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1.08, 303.26 (LexisNexis 2008).
158. See supra note 156.
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nations if the taking:
1) confers a private benefit on a particular private party through the
use of the property; (2) is for a public use that is merely a pretext to
confer a private benefit on a particular private party; or (3) is for economic development purposes, unless the economic development is a
secondary purpose resulting from municipal community development
or municipal urban renewal activities to eliminate an existing affirmative harm on society from slum or blighted areas . . . .159

Taken literally, the first criterion in the act might be used
to forbid almost all condemnations, since even traditional public uses often “confer a private benefit on a particular private
party through the use of the property.”160 Presumably, however, this prohibition is intended merely to forbid condemnations
that create such a private benefit without also serving a public
use. Otherwise, the state legislature would not be able to protect “community development” and “urban renewal” takings,
which surely confer “private benefits” for “particular” persons.161
The legislation’s ban on pretextual takings merely reiterates current law. Kelo itself states that government is
“no[t] . . . allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a
public purpose, when [the] actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.”162
The ban on takings for economic development purposes is
largely vitiated by exemption for condemnations where “economic development is a secondary purpose resulting from municipal community development.”163 Virtually any project that
promotes economic development can also be plausibly characterized as advancing “community development.” It is difficult to
see how the two concepts can be meaningfully distinguished in
real world situations. Indeed, Texas law defines “community
development” to permit condemnation of any property that is
“inappropriately developed from the standpoint of sound community development and growth.”164 It is surely reasonable to
suppose that “sound community development and growth” includes economic “development and growth.”165

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001(b) (Vernon 2008).
Id.
Id.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005).
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001(b)(3) (Vernons 2008).
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 373.005(b)(1)(A) (Vernons 2005).
Id.
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The Texas legislation does contain two potentially effective
elements. First, it eliminates judicial deference to governmental determinations that a challenged condemnation is for a legitimate public use.166 This shifts the burden of proof in public
use cases to the condemning authority. Second, it seems to forbid private-to-private condemnations under statutes other than
those allowing the use of eminent domain for blight alleviation
and “community development.”167 However, as noted above,
Texas’ definition of “community development” is so broad that
it can be used to justify almost any condemnation even under a
nondeferential approach to judicial review. Judges are unlikely
to find that very many takings run afoul of the community development statute’s authorization of condemnation of property
that is “inappropriately developed from the standpoint of sound
community development and growth.”168 This broad standard
can also be used to defend a wide range of condemnations for
various private development projects even without specific legislative authorization other than the community development
law itself. Ultimately, the potentially effective elements of the
Texas law are swallowed up by the “community development”
exception.169
vii. Washington
The state of Washington’s recent eminent domain law170 is
not a true response to Kelo. It does not even pretend to restrict
economic development takings or cut back on the definition of
public use in any other way. Instead, the new statute seems to
be a response to a 2006 Washington Supreme Court decision
which held that property owners are not entitled to personal
notice of public meetings called to consider the necessity of initiating eminent domain proceedings against them.171 Because
166. § 2206.001(e).
167. See id. § 2206.001(b)(3) (referencing other Texas laws allowing takings
for community development or improving blighted areas). These statutes are
listed as the only broad exceptions to the bill’s ban on takings “for economic
development purposes.” Id. § 2206.001(b).
168. § 373.005(b)(1)(A).
169. Sandefur is more optimistic about these two provisions, calling them
“significant improvements.” Sandefur, supra note 14, at 734. He does not,
however, consider the possibility that they can be circumvented by means of
the “community development” exception.
170. See Act of Apr. 17, 2007, ch. 68, 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws 268 (codified
in scattered sections of REV. CODE WASH. ch.8 (2007)).
171. See Cent. Puget Sound Reg’l Transp. Auth. v. Miller, 128 P.3d 588
(Wash. 2006). The state’s Senate Committee on the Judiciary cited this deci-
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the new law was neither a response to Kelo nor an attempt to
narrow the definition of public use, I do not classify it as a postKelo reform. Changing this classification would not noticeably
alter the quantitative data discussed in Part III,172 nor would it
alter the overall conclusions of this Article. If the law were to
be viewed as a post-Kelo reform, it would be classified as adding little or nothing to the protections Washington property
owners already enjoyed before Kelo. The state supreme court
banned economic development takings in 1959,173 and Washington already had a narrow definition of blight.174
2. Legislatively Enacted Laws that Provide Substantially
Increased Protection for Property Owners
Fourteen state legislatures have enacted laws that either
abolish or significantly constrain economic development takings. The most sweeping of these laws are Florida’s and New
Mexico’s, which not only abolish condemnations for economic
development, but also ban all blight condemnations, even those
that occur in areas that would meet a strict definition of the
term.175 Florida and New Mexico therefore became the second
and third states to abolish blight condemnations, following in
the footsteps of Utah, which did so prior to Kelo.176 Unlike Utah
sion as the reason for passing the new Washington law. See S. REPORT, Substitute H.B. 1458, 60th Leg. (Wash. 2007), available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/
pub/billinfo/2007-08/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/Senate/1458-S.SBR.pdf.
172. If I classified Washington state as having passed either an effective or
ineffective reform law, that would not alter the political ignorance findings
discussed in Part III because there are too few Washington respondents in the
sample to make a statistically significant difference.
173. See Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 341 P.2d 171, 187 (Wash. 1959) (denying
condemnation of residential property so that an agency could “devote it to
what it consider[ed] a higher and better economic use”).
174. See WASH. REV. CODE § 35.80A.010 (2008) (defining blight narrowly
for purposes of condemnation).
175. See Act of May 11, 2006, ch. 2006–11, 2006 Fla. Laws 214 (codified in
scattered sections of FLA. STAT.); Act of Apr. 3, 2007, 2007 N.M. Laws 3873,
ch. 330 (codified in scattered sections of N.M. STAT.). The New Mexico bill does
still permit the condemnation of property that is characterized by “obsolete or
impractical planning and platting” and “(a) was platted prior to 1971; (b) has
remained vacant and unimproved; and (c) threatens the health, safety and
welfare of persons or property due to erosion, flooding and inadequate drainage.” Act of Apr. 3, 2007, 2007 N.M. Laws 3873, ch. 330, § 3-18-10(B)(3) (codified in scattered sections of N.M. STAT.).
176. See supra note 81. However, Utah partially rescinded its ban on blight
condemnations in a more recent bill. See Act of Mar. 21, 2007, ch. 379, 2007
Utah Laws 2326 (codified in scattered sections of UTAH CODE ANN. § 17C)
(permitting blight condemnations if approved by a supermajority of property
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and New Mexico, which made little use of economic development and blight takings even before the enactment of their new
laws,177 Florida has an extensive record of dubious economic
development and blight condemnations.178 Due to its broad
scope and enactment in a large state that previously made extensive use of private-to-private takings, the new Florida law is
probably the most important post-Kelo legislative victory for
property rights activists.
South Dakota’s new law is only slightly less sweeping than
Florida’s. It continues to permit blight condemnations, but does
not allow any takings—including those in blighted areas—that
“transfer property to any private person, nongovernmental entity, or other public-private business entity.”179 This forbids economic development takings, and also greatly reduces the political incentive to engage in blight condemnations, since local
governments can no longer use such takings to transfer property to politically influential interests.180 Kansas’s new law is
similar to South Dakota’s insofar as it bans nearly all privateto-private condemnations.181 It forbids condemnations “for the
purpose of selling, leasing or otherwise transferring such property to any private entity” except in cases where needed for
public utilities or where there is defective title.182 Blight condemnations are limited to cases where the property in question
is “unsafe for occupation by humans under the building
codes.”183
Eight state reform laws couple a ban on economic development condemnations with restrictions on the definition of
blight that, roughly speaking, restrict blight condemnations to
owners in the affected area).
177. A report prepared by the Institute for Justice (IJ) does not list a single
private-to-private condemnation in Utah during the entire five-year period
from 1998 to 2002. BERLINER, supra note 66, at 196. The IJ Report concluded
(two years before the enactment of the 2005 reform law) that “Utah has done
fairly well in avoiding the use of eminent domain for private parties.” Id. New
Mexico did not have any private-to-private condemnations during the 1998–
2002 period. Id. at 143.
178. Id. at 52–58.
179. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11-7-22.1(1) (Supp. 2008).
180. For arguments that this is a major problem with economic development and blight condemnations, see Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 15, at
190–205, 264 –71.
181. See Act of May 18, 2006, ch. 192, 2006 Kan. Sess. Laws 1345, §§ 1–2
(codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-501a, 26-501b (Supp. 2008)).
182. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-501a(b) (Supp. 2008).
183. Id. § 26-501b(e).
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areas that fit the intuitive definition of the term. This formula
was successfully used in the Alabama,184 Georgia,185 Idaho,186
Indiana,187 Michigan,188 New Hampshire,189 Virginia,190 and
184. See ALA. CODE § 24 -2-2(c) (2008) (limiting definition of blight to a
relatively narrow range of situations, such as property that is “unfit for human habitation,” poses a public health risk, or has major tax delinquencies);
id. § 11-47-170(b) (forbidding condemnations that “transfer” nonblighted property to private parties).
185. See GEO. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(1), (10) (Supp. 2008) (forbidding economic development takings, and defining blight to include primarily risks to
health, the environment, and safety, while excluding “esthetic” considerations).
186. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701A(2)(b) (Supp. 2008) (forbidding condemnations “[f ]or the purpose of promoting or effectuating economic development” and for the acquisition of nonblighted property, and defining blight as a
condition that poses physical risks to the occupants of a building, spreads disease or crime, or poses “an actual risk of harm” to public safety, health, morals, or welfare). The burden of proof for showing that blight exists is on the
government. See id. Nonetheless, there is some room for potential slippage in
the Idaho law because of the possibility that property could be condemned
merely for posing an “actual risk of harm” to public “morals” or “welfare,” concepts that could be defined broadly enough to include most economic development takings. Id. § 7-701A(2)(b)(ii).
187. See IND. CODE § 32-24 -4.5-7 (Supp. 2008) (forbidding most private-toprivate condemnations and defining blight as an area that “constitutes a public nuisance,” is unfit for habitation, does not meet the building code, is a fire
hazard, or is “otherwise dangerous”).
188. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 213.23(1), (3), (8) (Supp. 2008) (banning condemnations for “general economic development” and limiting the definition of
“blight” to property that is a “public nuisance,” an “attractive nuisance,” poses
a threat to public safety, such as a fire hazard, or is abandoned). The law does
have a potential loophole insofar as it permits the condemnation of property as
“blighted” if it “is not maintained in accordance with applicable local housing
or property maintenance codes or ordinances.” Id. § 213.23(8)(g). This could
allow local governments to manipulate the content of local property codes in
such a way as to make it impossible for all or most property owners to fully
comply, thus potentially opening the door to sweeping condemnation authority
for economic development purposes. My tentative judgment is that this loophole is not broad enough to completely negate the impact of the new statute.
189. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205:3-b (Supp. 2008) (defining public use
as “exclusively” limited to government ownership, public utilities and common
carriers, and blight-like condemnations needed to “remove structures beyond
repair, public nuisances, structures unfit for human habitation or use, and
abandoned property when such structures or property constitute a menace to
health and safety”).
190. See VA. CODE ANN. § 1-219.1 (2008) (permitting condemnation of private property only if “(i) the property is taken for the possession, ownership,
occupation, and enjoyment of property by the public or a public corporation;
(ii) the property is taken for construction, maintenance, or operation of public
facilities by public corporations or by private entities provided that there is a
written agreement with a public corporation providing for use of the facility by
the public; (iii) the property is taken for the creation or functioning of any pub-
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Wyoming191 statutes. In the case of Nevada, the new legislation
was enacted only in the aftermath of a referendum initiative
that would ban both economic development and blight condemnations entirely.
Two state laws—Pennsylvania and Minnesota—forbid economic development takings and restrict the definition of blight,
but significantly undermine their effectiveness by exempting
large parts of the state from the law’s coverage. The Pennsylvania law forbids “the exercise by any condemnor of the power
of eminent domain to take private property in order to use it for
private commercial enterprise,”192 and imposes a restrictive definition of blight.193 However, the scope of this provision is undermined by the effective exclusion of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, as well as some other areas, from its coverage.194 These
two cities, by far the state’s largest urban areas, are also the
sites of many of the state’s most extensive private-to-private
takings.195 Although the provision exempting the two cities is
set to expire on December 31, 2012,196 it is possible that legislalic service corporation, public service company, or railroad; (iv) the property is
taken for the provision of any authorized utility service by a government utility corporation; (v) the property is taken for the elimination of blight provided
that the property itself is a blighted property; or (vi) the property taken is in a
redevelopment or conservation area and is abandoned or the acquisition is
needed to clear title where one of the owners agrees to such acquisition or the
acquisition is by agreement of all the owners”). The new law also narrows the
definition of “blight” to include only “property that endangers the public health
or safety in its condition at the time of the filing of the petition for condemnation and is (i) a public nuisance or (ii) an individual commercial, industrial, or
residential structure or improvement that is beyond repair or unfit for human
occupancy or use.” Id. § 1-219.1(B).
191. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-801(c) (2007) (“As used in and for purposes of this section only, ‘public purpose’ means the possession, occupation and
enjoyment of the land by a public entity. ‘Public purpose’ shall not include the
taking of private property by a public entity for the purpose of transferring the
property to another private individual or private entity except in the case of
condemnation for the purpose of protecting the public health and safety. . . .”).
Technically, this law seems to forbid blight condemnations. However, the provision permitting condemnations for the purpose of protecting “public health
and safety” is functionally equivalent to allowing condemnation under an extremely narrow definition of blight.
192. 26 PA CONS. STAT. § 204(a) (Supp. 2008).
193. See id. § 205(b), (c).
194. See id. § 203(4) (excluding areas designated as blighted within “a city
of the first or second class,” which under law turns out to be Pittsburgh and
Philadelphia).
195. See BERLINER, supra note 66, at 173, 179–81 (describing major condemnation projects in the two cities).
196. See § 203(4).
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tors will be able to extend the deadline, once the public furor
over Kelo has subsided.
Minnesota’s 2006 law was similar. It too banned economic
development takings and restricted the definition of blight,197
while creating some major geographic exemptions. In this case,
the exemptions included land located in some 2000 Tax Increment Financing Districts, including much of the territory of the
Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, where a high proportion of the state’s condemnations take place.198 A survey by the
pro-Kelo League of Minnesota Cities found that twenty-seven of
the thirty-four Minnesota cities that had used private-toprivate takings for economic development purposes between
1999 and 2005 are located in the Twin Cities area, which was
exempt from the state’s 2006 post-Kelo reform law.199 Thus, the
new law impacted only a small fraction of those cities that actually engage in the practices it sought to curb. Like Pennsylvania’s exemptions, Minnesota’s were time-limited, scheduled
to expire in five years.200 However, the Minnesota exemptions
were superseded by a new law enacted in early 2009, just as
this article went to press.201

197. See MINN. STAT. § 117.025 (2008) (defining “public use” to mean exclusively direct public use, or mitigation of blight, or a public nuisance, and not
“the public benefits of economic development,” and defining a “blighted area”
as an urban area where more than half of the buildings are “structurally
substandard” in the sense of having two or more building code violations).
198. Id. § 117.011 (2008) (setting out exceptions for tax increment financing districts), repealed by MINN. STAT. § 117.012 (West 2009 Electronic Update).
199. See LEAGUE OF MINNESOTA CITIES, RESEARCH ON CITIES’ USE OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (2005) (on file with author); see also Eric Willette, LMC
Study Finds Cities Use Eminent Domain Judiciously, LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES BULLETIN, Nov. 30, 2005, at 1. The LMC study claims that these cities
use eminent domain only rarely and judiciously. Id. However, it also notes
that the thirty-four cities engaged in an average of twelve economic development takings per year, many of them involving “multiple parcels” of land. Id.
This yields a total of over 400 economic development takings per year in the
state of Minnesota, a fairly large number for a state with a population of only
5.1 million. See infra tbl.A3. If each of these takings impacted about twelve
people (a conservative estimate in view of the fact that many involved multiple
parcels), then about 5000 Minnesotans lose property to economic development
takings per year, for a total of 35,000 during the seven year period studied by
the LMC. Between 1999 and 2005, some seven tenths of a percent of the Minnesota population may have lost property or been displaced by economic development condemnations.
200. See MINN. STAT. § 117.011 (2008).
201. See MINN. STAT. § 117.012 (West 2009 Electronic Update) (repealing
exemptions in the 2006 law).
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Even many of the fourteen state laws that do succeed in
abolishing or curbing economic development takings have serious limitations. As already noted, the Pennsylvania law i seriously weakened by geographic exemptions that exclude the
state’s largest urban areas. The reforms enacted by Alabama,
Georgia, and South Dakota were adopted by states that had little or no recent history of resorting to private-to-private condemnations;202 thus, they forbid practices in which their local
governments rarely engaged. Overall, only seven states that
had previously engaged in significant amounts of economic development and blight condemnation adopted legislative postKelo reform measures with real teeth.
3. Reforms Enacted by Popular Referendum
In sharp contrast to legislatively enacted post-Kelo reforms, those adopted by popular referendum are, on average,
much stronger. In 2006, ten states adopted post-Kelo reforms
by popular referendum.203 All ten passed by large margins
ranging from 55% to 86% of the vote.204 Of these, at least six
and possibly seven provided significantly stronger protection
for property owners than was available under existing law. Two
other states—Georgia and New Hampshire—passed initiatives
that added little or nothing to post-Kelo reforms already
enacted by the state legislature.205 Finally, South Carolina vot202. See BERLINER, supra note 66, at 10–11 (noting that Alabama “has
mostly refrained from abusing the power of eminent domain in recent years”
and had only one documented private-to-private condemnation in 2002); id. at
59 (noting that Georgia is “one of a handful of states with no reported instances” of such condemnations between 1998 and 2002); id. at 189 (same as
to South Dakota).
203. For a complete list and other details, see Nat’l Conference of State
Legislatures, Property Rights Issues on the 2006 Ballot, Nov. 12, 2006,
http://www.ncsl.org/statevote/prop_rights_06.htm (last visitedMay 17, 2009)
[hereinafter NCSL].
204. Id. Only two post-Kelo ballot initiatives were defeated—one in Idaho
and one in California. Id. Both lost primarily because they were tied to controversial measures limiting “regulatory takings.” See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur,
The California Crack-up, LIBERTY, Feb. 2007, available at http://liberty
unbound.com/archive/2007_02/sandefur-california.html (attributing the defeat
of California’s Proposition 90 primarily to the shortcomings of the regulatory
takings element of the proposal and strategic errors of its supporters). No
stand-alone post-Kelo public-use referendum initiative was defeated anywhere
in the country. See NCSL, supra note 203.
205. See Ga. Amendment 1 (enacted on Nov. 7, 2006 and amending GA.
CONST. art. IX, § 2); N.H. Question 1 (enacted on Nov. 7, 2006 and amending
N.H. CONST. art. 12-a).
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ers adopted a largely ineffective reform law. 206 It is crucial to
recognize that referenda initiated by citizen groups were far
more likely to lead to effective laws than those enacted by state
legislatures. Indeed, only one state—Louisiana—passed a legislature-initiated referendum that provided significantly greater
protection for property owners than that available under preexisting statutory law enacted through the ordinary legislative
process.207
Three states—Arizona,208 Louisiana,209 and Oregon210—
enacted referendum initiatives that essentially followed the
standard formula of combining a ban on economic development
takings with a restrictive definition of blight. Nevada and
North Dakota’s initiatives went one step beyond this and
amended their respective state constitutions to ban virtually all
condemnations that transfer property to a private owner.211
The Nevada law did not take effect until it was approved by the
voters a second time in November 2008.212
Florida’s referendum initiative could not add much in the
way of substantive protections to the state’s legislatively
206. S.C. Amendment 5 (amending S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13).
207. La. Amendment 5 (amending LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B), art. VI, § 21(A)
and adding art. VI, § 21(D)).
208. See Ariz. Proposition 207 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006) (codified at ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1131 to -1138) (forbidding condemnations for “economic development” and limiting blight-like condemnations to cases where there is “a
direct threat to public health or safety caused by the property in its current
condition”).
209. La. Amendment 5 (enacted Sept. 30, 2006) (amending LA. CONST. art.
I, § 4(B), art. VI, § 21(A) and adding art. VI, § 21(D)) (forbidding condemnations for “economic development” and tax revenue purposes, and confining
blight condemnations to cases where there is a threat to public health or safety).
210. Or. Measure 39 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006) (codified at OR. REV. STAT.
§ 35.015) (forbidding most private-to-private condemnations and limiting
blight-like condemnations to cases where they are needed to eliminate dangers
to public health or safety).
211. See Nev. Ballot Question 2 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006, reenacted on Nov. 4
2008) (amending NEV. CONST. art. I, § 22) (forbidding the “direct or indirect
transfer of any interest in property taken in an eminent domain proceeding
from one private party to another private party”); N.D. Measure 2 (amending
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16) (mandating that “public use or a public purpose does
not include public benefits of economic development, including an increase in
tax base, tax revenues, employment, or general economic health. Private property shall not be taken for the use of, or ownership by, any private individual
or entity, unless that property is necessary for conducting a common carrier or
utility business”).
212. See Nev. Ballot Question 2 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006, reenacted on Nov. 4,
2008) (amending NEV. CONST. art. I, § 22).
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enacted post-Kelo law, already the strongest in the country.213
However, Constitutional Amendment 8 did alter the state constitution to provide an important procedural protection: no new
law allowing “the transfer of private property taken by eminent
domain to a natural person or private entity” can be passed
without a three-fifths supermajority in the state legislature.214
This could be an important safeguard for property owners
against the erosion of public use protections by future state legislatures, after public attention has shifted away from eminent
domain issues.
Georgia’s new law adds little to that state’s strong legislatively enacted post-Kelo statute, requiring only that any new
private-to-private takings be approved by local elected officials.215 New Hampshire’s referendum initiative also comes in
the wake of a strong legislative proposal and adds nothing to
it.216 Indeed, absent the earlier legislation, it would provide no
real protection at all, since it only forbids condemnations “for
the purpose of private development or other private use of the
property.”217 This wording is largely useless because it does not
foreclose the argument that the transfer of property to a private party will promote “public development” that benefits the
community as a whole, not just private individuals.218
South Carolina’s referendum seems to forbid takings for
economic development. However, the wording may actually
permit such takings, since it states that “[p]rivate property
must not be condemned by eminent domain for any purpose or
benefit, including, but not limited to, the purpose or benefit of
economic development, unless the condemnation is for public
use.”219 This, however, leaves open the question of whether
economic development is in fact a public use—the very issue
addressed by Kelo with respect to the Federal Constitution.
Current South Carolina case law already holds that economic
213. See supra notes 177–178 and accompanying text.
214. Fla. Amendment 8 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006) (amending FLA. CONST. art.
X, § 6).
215. Ga. Amendment 1 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006) (amending GA. CONST. art.
IX, § 2).
216. N.H. Question 1 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006) (amending N.H. CONST. art.
12-a).
217. Id.
218. See the discussion of the similar flaw in the wording of President
Bush’s 2006 executive order on Kelo in infra Part II.B.3.
219. S.C. Amendment 5 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006) (amending S.C. CONST. art.
I, § 13(A)).
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development is not a public use under the state constitution.220
The new constitutional amendment adds nothing to this the
case law and leaves open the possibility that future court decisions will be able to reverse it in the absence of a clear textual
statement in the state constitution to the contrary. The South
Carolina amendment also narrows the definition of blight to
“property constituting a danger to the safety and health of the
community by reason of lack of ventilation, light, and sanitary
facilities, dilapidation, deleterious land use, or any combination
of these factors.”221 However, this provision also has a potential
loophole, since “deleterious land use” and “health of the community” could both be interpreted broadly to include the community’s “economic health” and “deleterious” land uses that
undermine it. At best, the amendment modestly increases the
protection provided by current law.
The state of California enacted an ineffective referendum
initiative, Proposition 99, in June 2008.222 This initiative was
put on the ballot by the California League of Cities and other
pro-condemnation groups for the purpose of forestalling the
more restrictive Proposition 98 (sponsored by property rights
advocates).223 Proposition 99 protects only owner-occupied residences against condemnations with the purpose of transferring
property to “private persons” if the owner has lived in the home
for at least one year.224 Renters, who make up 42% of California
households, are left unprotected.225 The same is true of businesses and homeowners who have lived in their residences for
less than one year.226
220. See Karesh v. City Council of Charleston, 247 S.E.2d 342, 345 (S.C.
1978) (striking down taking justified only by economic development).
221. S.C. Amendment 5 (amending S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13(B)).
222. See Cal. Proposition 99 (enacted June 3, 2008) (amending CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 19).
223. See Ilya Somin, Prop. 99’s False Promise of Reform, L.A. TIMES, May
19, 2008, at A15. Proposition 99 includes a provision that would negate any
conflicting eminent domain reform passed the same day, so long as Proposition
99 got more votes than its competitor. Cal. Proposition 99, § 9 (enacted on
June 3, 2008). See also Samantha Young, Voters Reject Prop. 98, Endorse Prop.
99, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, June 4, 2008 (noting that the California
League of Cities placed Proposition 99 on the ballot and spent eleven million
dollars on promoting it and working to defeat Proposition 98).
224. See Cal. Proposition 99 § 2, (enacted June 3, 2008) (amending CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 19(b), (e)(3)) (exempting from protection owner-occupied residences where the owner has resided for less than one year).
225. Somin, supra note 223.
226. See id.
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Even the new protection for homeowners is likely to be ineffective, because the measure allows the condemnation of
owner-occupied homes if they are “incidental” to a “public work
or improvement” project.227 This means that homes could still
be taken for transfer to private developers if the proposed
project allocated some space for a “public” facility such as a
community center or library. Proposition 99 also allows government officials to claim that their true purpose is promoting
economic or community development rather than conveyance of
the property to a private person, which is only a means to an
end. This, of course, is precisely the argument accepted by the
Supreme Court in Kelo, when it held that the transfer of the
condemned property to a private party was constitutionally
permissible because it was undertaken for the “public purpose”
of promoting development;228 Kelo already forbids “pretextual”
takings adopted for the sole purpose of benefiting a private party,229 a protection that is likely to be ineffectual because condemning authorities can virtually always claim that they intended to benefit the general public as well.230 In sum,
Proposition 99 only applies to a subset of properties. And even
with respect to them, it gives owners little protection beyond
that already afforded by Kelo itself.
The new Michigan amendment is an ambiguous case. The
amendment forbids condemnation of property “for transfer to a
private entity for the purpose of economic development or enhancement of tax revenues.”231 However, it did not change the
state’s previously broad definition of “blight.” At this time, it is
227. See Cal. Proposition 99 (enacted June 3, 2008) (amending CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 19(e)(5)) (exempting takings of homes that are “incidental” to a variety
of “public work[s] or improvement[s]”). The text of this section reads:
“Public work or improvement” means facilities or infrastructure for
the delivery of public services such as education, police, fire protection, parks, recreation, emergency medical, public health, libraries,
flood protection, streets or highways, public transit, railroad, airports
and seaports; utility, common carrier or other similar projects such as
energy-related, communication-related, water-related and wastewater-related facilities or infrastructure; projects identified by a State or
local government for recovery from natural disasters; and private
uses incidental to, or necessary for, the public work or improvement.
228. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478–85 (2005).
229. Id. at 478 (stating that the “mere pretext” of a public benefit is not
enough to justify a taking if the “actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit”).
230. See Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 15, at 235–40.
231. Mich. Ballot Proposal 06-04 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006) (amending MICH.
CONST. art. X, § 2).
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not clear whether or not the landmark 2004 state supreme
court decision in County of Wayne v. Hathcock will be interpreted to constrain condemnation of property under very broad
blight designations.232 If Hathcock is held to limit broad blight
designations, then the new constitutional amendment would
have the modest but real advantage of providing explicit textual foundations for Hathcock’s holding and reducing the
chance of its reversal or erosion by future courts. If, on the other hand, Hathcock is interpreted to permit broad definitions of
blight, then the Michigan referendum initiative will be largely
ineffective in its own right. At this point, however, the status of
the Michigan referendum initiative is largely moot because
Michigan’s legislative reform has already narrowed the definition of blight.233 Thus, the Michigan constitutional amendment
enacted by referendum reinforces the accomplishments of the
previous statutory reform, but might not have been effective as
a standalone law.
In analyzing the post-Kelo referendum initiatives, it is important to note that four of the six clearly effective laws were
enacted by means of initiative processes that allow activists to
place a measure on the ballot without prior approval by the
state legislature.234 One of the other two (Florida) was sent to
the voters by a legislature that had already enacted the nation’s strongest post-Kelo reform law; only the Louisiana state
legislature forwarded to the voters a referendum initiative
without first enacting a strong legislative reform of its own.235
By contrast, all three largely ineffective initiatives required
preapproval by state legislatures,236 and the same was true of
the ambiguous Michigan case.237 The contrast is not so much
between legislative reform and referendum initiatives, but between referenda enacted without the need for approval by the
state legislature and every other type of reform that does involve state legislators.

232. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 779–86 (Mich.
2004). The status of blight condemnations under Hathcock is analyzed in Somin, supra note 78.
233. See supra note 188.
234. The four are Arizona, Nevada, North Dakota, and Oregon. See NCSL,
supra note 203.
235. See NCSL, supra note 203.
236. The three were Georgia, New Hampshire, and South Carolina. Id.
237. Id.
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B. FEDERAL LAW
1. The Private Property Rights Protection Act
On November 3, 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed the Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005
(“PRPA”) by an overwhelming 376 to 38 margin.238 Since early
2006, the PRPA has been bottled up in the Senate239 and the
109th Congress ended without the Act being passed into law. In
May 2007, under the new Democratic Congress, the Act passed
the Agriculture Committee of the House of Representatives;
however, as of November 2008, it has not yet been voted on by
the full House.240 To date, there is no indication as to whether
the PRPA will be taken up by the new administration and Congress that were elected in November 2008. Despite its failure to
achieve passage so far, I consider it here because it is arguably
the most important federal effort to provide increased protection for property owners in the aftermath of Kelo.
The Act would block state and local governments from “exercis[ing] [their] power of eminent domain, or allow[ing] the exercise of such power by any person or entity to which such power has been delegated, over property to be used for economic
development or over property that is subsequently used for
economic development, if that State or political subdivision
receives Federal economic development funds during any fiscal
year in which it does so.”241 Violators are punished by the loss
of all “[f]ederal economic development funds for a period of two
fiscal years.”242 Condemnation for economic development is
broadly defined to include any taking that transfers property
“from one private person or entity to another private person or
entity for commercial enterprise carried on for profit, or to in-

238. H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted).
239. See Scott Bullock, The Specter of Condemnation, WALL ST. J., June 24,
2006 (explaining how the PRPA was held up by Senator Arlen Specter, then
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee).
240. The PRPA has been renamed as the “Strengthening the Ownership of
Private Property Act of 2007.” Text available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/
gpoxmlc110/h926_ih.xml (last visited Mar. 13, 2009). On June 5, 2007, the legislation was referred to the House Subcommittee on Healthy Families and
Communities. No further action has been taken as of this writing. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS–THOMAS, H.R. 926, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d110:HR00926:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
241. H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. § 2(a) (2005).
242. Id. § 2(b).
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crease tax revenue, tax base, employment, or general economic
health.”243
Tthe House bill might appear to create significant incentives to deter state and local governments from pursuing economic development takings. But any such appearance is deceptive because of the small amount of federal funds that offending
state and local governments stand to lose.
States and localities that run afoul of the PRPA would risk
losing only “federal economic development funds,”244 defined as
“any Federal funds distributed to or through States or political
subdivisions of States under Federal laws designed to improve
or increase the size of economies of States or political subdivisions of States.”245 The precise definition of “economic development funds” remains unclear, as it is difficult to tell precisely
which federal programs are “designed to improve or increase
the size of the economies of States or political subdivisions of
States.”246 A Congressional Research Service analysis concluded that the PRPA ultimately would delegate the task of
identifying the relevant programs to the Attorney General.247 It
is hard to say whether the incoming Obama Administration
would be willing to antagonize state and local governments by
defining “economic development funds” broadly.
For present purposes, I count any grants to state and local
governments that are designated as “development” programs in
the federal budget. The 2005 federal budget defined only about
13.9 billion dollars of the annual total of the estimated 416.5
billion dollars in federal grants to states as designated for pur243. Id. § 8(1). The Act goes on to establish several exemptions, but these
are relatively narrow. See id. § 8(1)(A)–(G) (exempting condemnations that
transfer property to public ownership and several other traditional public
uses).
244. Id. § 2(b).
245. Id. § 8(2).
246. Id.
247. ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONDEMNATION OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL COMMENTS ON THE HOUSEPASSED BILL (H.R. 4128) AND BOND AMENDMENT 4 (2005). The report bases
this conclusion on section 5(a)(2) of the PRPA, which requires the Attorney
General to compile a list of economic development grants, but does not explicitly state that the list should be used as a guide for determining which funds
to cut off in the event of PRPA violations. Id. at 4 & n.7 (citing H.R. 4128,
109th Cong. § 5(a)(2) (2005)). Section 11 of the Act does require that the Act
“be construed in favor of a broad protection of private property rights.” H.R.
4128, § 11. However, it is unclear whether this requirement will bind the Attorney General in his determination of the range of programs covered by the
Act’s funding cutoff.

2009]

POLITICAL RESPONSE TO KELO

2151

poses of “community and regional development.”248 This
amount includes 3.5 billion dollars “for homeland security,”
“Departmental Management,” and over 3 billion dollars for
“Emergency Preparedness and Response”249— funds that are
unlikely to be categorized as economic development grants.
Thus, it would seem that PRPA applies at most to just 7.4 billion dollars in federal grants to state and local governments, a
mere 1.8% of all federal grants to states and localities.
In some areas, of course, economic development grants
might constitute an atypically large share of the local budget,
so there are likely to be some parts of the country where PRPA
has real bite. However, this effect is likely to be diminished by
the ease with which offending localities can escape the sanction
of loss of funding. State or local authorities that run afoul of
PRPA can avoid all loss of federal funds so long as they “return[] . . .all real property the taking of which was found by a
court of competent jurisdiction to have constituted a violation of
[the act]” and replace or repair property damaged or destroyed
“as a result of such violation.”250 Condemning authorities thus
have an incentive to roll the dice on economic development takings projects in the hope that defendants will not contest the
condemnation or will fail to raise the PRPA as a defense.251 At
worst, the offending government can simply give up the project,
leaving itself and whatever private interests it sought to benefit not much worse off than they were to begin with. So long as
it returns the condemned property, any such government
stands to lose only the time and effort expended in litigation
and the funds necessary to repair or pay for any property that
has been damaged or destroyed.
While the PRPA may have some beneficial effects in deterring economic development condemnations in communities
with an unusually high level of dependence on federal economic
development funds, its impact if enacted is likely to be quite
limited.

248. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 125 tbl.8-4, 126, 130
(F.Y. 2005) (estimated figures for the 2005 fiscal year).
249. Id. at 125 tbl.8-4.
250. H.R. 4128, § 2(c).
251. This may not be an unlikely occurrence, given that many property
owners targeted for condemnation are likely to be poor and legally unsophisticated. Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 15, at 254 n.373.
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2. The Bond Amendment
The Bond Amendment was enacted on November 30, 2005,
as an amendment to the 2006 appropriation bill for the Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development departments, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and various
independent agencies.252 It forbids the use of funds allocated in
the Act to “support” the use of eminent domain for “economic
development that primarily benefits private entities.”253
For three interrelated reasons, the Bond Amendment is
likely to have little impact on the use of eminent domain by
state and local governments. First, the Amendment forbids only those economic development takings that “primarily benefit . . . private entities.”254 This restriction makes it possible for
the condemning jurisdiction to argue that the primary benefit
of the development will go to the public. Under Kelo’s extremely
lenient standards for evaluating government claims that takings create public benefits,255 it is unlikely that such an argument will often fail in federal court.
Second, the Bond Amendment completely exempts condemnations for:
mass transit, railroad, airport, seaport, or highway projects as well as
utility projects which benefit or serve the general public . . . other
structures designated for use by the general public or which have other common-carrier or public-utility functions that serve the general
public and are subject to regulation and oversight by the government,
and projects for the removal of an immediate threat to public health
and safety . . . or brownfield[s].256

While many of these exceptions are unproblematic because
they fall within the traditional public use categories of facilities
owned by the government or available for use by the general
public as a matter of legal right, the listing of “utility projects
which benefit . . . the general public”257 might open up the door
to at least some private economic development projects.

252. Act of Nov. 30, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat. 2396, 2494 –
95 (2005).
253. Id. at 2495.
254. Id.
255. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488 (2005) (stating that
courts should not “second-guess [a] City’s considered judgments about the efficacy of its development plan”).
256. § 726, 119 Stat. at 2495, reprinted in MELTZ, supra note 247, at 12
(replacing the language “an immediate threat to public health and safety” with
“blight”).
257. Id.
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Finally, the Bond Amendment’s impact is likely to be small
because very few projects that do not fall within one of its many
exceptions are likely to be funded by federal transportation and
housing grants in any event. The law completely excludes from
coverage “mass transit” and “highway projects.”258 There are
few if any eminent domain projects previously funded by federal transportation or housing grants that the bill actually forbids.
3. President Bush’s June 23, 2006 Executive Order
On June 23, 2006, the one year anniversary of the Kelo decision, President George W. Bush issued an executive order
that purported to bar federal involvement in Kelo-style takings.259 On the surface, the order seems to forbid federal agencies from undertaking economic development condemnations,
but its wording undercuts this goal. The key part of the order
reads:
It is the policy of the United States to protect the rights of Americans
to their private property, including by limiting the taking of private
property by the Federal Government to situations in which the taking
is for public use, with just compensation, and for the purpose of benefiting the general public and not merely for the purpose of advancing
the economic interest of private parties to be given ownership or use
of the property taken.260

Read carefully, the order does not in fact bar condemnations that transfer property to other private parties for economic development. Instead, it permits them to continue so long as
they are “for the purpose of benefiting the general public and
not merely for the purpose of advancing the economic interest
of private parties to be given ownership or use of the property
taken.”261
Unfortunately, this language validates virtually any economic development condemnation that the federal government
might want to pursue. Officials can (and do) always claim that
the goal of a taking is to benefit “the general public” and not
“merely” the new owners.262 This is not a new pattern, but one
that bedeviled takings litigation before Kelo; indeed, the New
London authorities made such claims in Kelo itself and they
were accepted by all nine Supreme Court Justices, including
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
Exec. Order No. 13,406, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,973 (June 23, 2006).
Id.
Id.
See Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 15, at 246.
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the four dissenters,263 as well as by the Connecticut Supreme
Court264 (including its three dissenters).265 The Justices
reached this conclusion despite considerable evidence that the
takings were instigated by the Pfizer Corporation, which at the
time hoped to benefit from them.266 Nonetheless, the courts accepted New London’s claims that its officials acted in good
faith, since they could have intended to benefit the public as
well as Pfizer.267
Even had President Bush’s order been worded more strongly, its impact would have been limited. The vast majority of
economic development condemnations are undertaken by state
and local governments, not by federal agencies. Nonetheless, it
is noteworthy that the Bush administration apparently chose to
issue an executive order that is almost certain to have no effect
even in the rare instances where the federal government does
involve itself in Kelo-like takings.
III. EXPLAINING THE PATTERN
Why, in the face of the massive public backlash against Kelo, has there been so much ineffective legislation? At this early
date, it is difficult to provide a definitive answer. However, I
would tentatively suggest that the weakness of much post-Kelo
legislation is in large part due to widespread public ignorance.
Survey data produced for this Article show that the overwhelming majority of citizens know little or nothing about post-Kelo
reform laws in their states.268 This widespread ignorance may
well account for the ineffectiveness of many of the new laws. It
also helps account for several other aspects of the Kelo backlash, including its timing and the greater effectiveness of laws
enacted by referenda relative to those adopted through the legislative process.269 The political ignorance hypothesis accounts
for the pattern of reform laws better than the leading alterna-

263. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 –85 (2005); id.
at 501 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
264. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 535 (Conn. 2004), aff ’d, 545
U.S. 469 (2005).
265. Id. at 595–96.
266. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473–75.
267. See Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 15, at 235–40.
268. See infra tbl.6.
269. See supra Part II.A.3.
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tive theory, which holds that the relative paucity of effective
reform laws is the result of interest group lobbying.270
A. PUBLIC IGNORANCE AND POST-KELO REFORM LAWS: THE
SAINT INDEX SURVEY DATA
As noted earlier, the majority of voters are “rationally ignorant” about most aspects of public policy because there is so
little chance that an increase in any one voter’s knowledge
would have a significant impact on policy outcomes. 271 No matter how knowledgeable a voter becomes, the chance that his or
her better-informed vote will actually swing an electoral outcome is infinitesimally small. There is, therefore, very little incentive for most citizens to acquire information about politics
and public policy, at least so long as their only reason to do so is
to become better-informed voters.272
Recent survey data compiled at my request by the Saint
Consulting Group, a firm that sponsors surveys on land use
policy, confirm the hypothesis that most Americans have little
or no knowledge of post-Kelo reform. The data compiled in Table 6are based on an August 2007 Saint Index national survey.
273 Because the state of Rhode Island enacted its post-Kelo law
in 2008, it is coded as not having passed any law for purposes of
my analysis of the Saint Index data, which was collected in August 2007. Dropping Rhode Island respondents from the analysis has no statistically significant impact on the results.
The Saint Index results demonstrate that political ignorance about post-Kelo reform is widespread. Only 13% of respondents could both correctly answer whether or not their
states had enacted eminent domain reform laws between 2005
and the date of the survey, and correctly answer a follow-up
question about whether or not those laws were likely to be effective in preventing condemnations for economic development.274 Only 21% could even correctly answer the first ques-

270. See, e.g., Sandefur, supra note 14, at 769–72 (arguing that interestgroup opposition accounts for the failures of the Kelo backlash).
271. See supra text accompanying note 20.
272. For a more detailed discussion of the theory of rational ignorance, see
Ilya Somin, Knowledge About Ignorance: New Directions in the Study of Political Information, 18 CRITICAL REV. 255 (2006) (symposium on political knowledge); Somin, Political Ignorance, supra note 20.
273. See infra tbl.6.
274. For the exact wording of the two questions involved, see infra app. B.
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tion in the sequence: whether or not their state had enacted
eminent domain reform since Kelo was decided in 2005.275
It is also important to recognize that 6% of respondents believed that their states had enacted post-Kelo reforms that
were likely to be “effective” in reducing economic development
takings even though the state in fact had not. This is not a
large number in absolute terms, but it still represents more
than one-third of the 17% of respondents who expressed any
opinion at all about the effectiveness of their state’s reforms.276
An additional 2% wrongly believed that their states’ reform
laws were ineffective even though the opposite was in fact true.
Even among the small minority of Americans who paid close
enough attention to post-Kelo reform legislation to have an opinion about its effectiveness, there was a high degree of ignorance.277
Table 6 indicates that ignorance about state post-Kelo
reform cuts across gender, racial, and political lines. Some 85%
of men and 90% of women were ignorant about the condition of
post-Kelo reform, as were 82% of African-Americans, 89% of
whites, and similar overwhelming majorities of liberals and
conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, and other groups. It
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that most Americans are ignorant about the existence or lack thereof of post-Kelo reform
in their states, and even fewer can tell whether the reform was
effective or not.
The Saint Index data may even understate the amount of
ignorance about post-Kelo reform. Some respondents may have
gotten the right answers by guessing. In order to get a correct
answer, respondents living in the eight states that have not
passed any post-Kelo reform needed only to get one binary
question and had a 50% chance of getting the right answer
through random guessing; those living in the forty-two states
that have passed reform laws needed to get two such questions
correct, and thus had a 25% chance of doing so through random
guessing.278 Past research shows that many survey respondents
275. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23, qstn. 9; see infra app. B (question
wording).
276. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23, qstn. 10; see infra app. B (question
wording).
277. Only 17% of respondents expressed any opinion at all about the effectiveness of post-Kelo reform in their states. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23,
qstn. 10.
278. Question 10 on the Saint Index survey has four possible answers in
addition to “don’t know.” See infra app. B. However, as described in Appendix
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will guess in order to avoid admitting ignorance about the subject matter of a poll question, and that may have happened in
this case as well.279 An additional factor biasing the knowledge
levels found in the Saint Index survey upwards is the fact that
the pollsters only surveyed Americans over the age of 21. Political knowledge is generally correlated with age,280 and young
adults (people aged 18–29) have the highest incidence of ignorance of any age group.281 The exclusion of 18–20 year olds from
the sample reduces the representation of this group in the aggregate data.

B, in each case I coded two different answers as “correct” for purposes of Table
6. Respondents living in states that had passed effective laws could get a “correct” answer by choosing either A or B, while those in states with ineffective
reforms could pick either C or D.
279. For the classic survey result showing that many respondents will express opinions even about completely fictitious legislation invented by researchers rather than admit ignorance, see Stanley Payne’s famous finding
that 70% of respondents expressed opinions regarding the nonexistent “Metallic Metals Act.” STANLEY PAYNE, THE ART OF ASKING QUESTIONS 18 (1951).
280. See MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS
KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 157 (1996). But see Somin, Political Ignorance, supra note 20, at 1327 (demonstrating only slight correlation
between political knowledge and age when controlling for fifteen other variables).
281. See MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, IS VOTING FOR YOUNG PEOPLE? 79–91
(2007) (summarizing evidence indicating that the young have the lowest levels
of political information of any age group).
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Table 6:
Public Knowledge of State Post-Kelo Reform282
Group
% Unaware of the Condition
of Post-Kelo Reform in their
State

Total

87

Male

85

Female

90

Gender

Racial/Ethnic283
Group

Party
Affiliation
Ideology

White

89

African American

82

Asian

75

Hispanic/Latino
Native American
Democrat
Independent
Republican
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative

100
75
89
83
89
88
90
87

The fact that most citizens are ignorant about post-Kelo
reform not surprising to researchers. Large majorities know
282. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23, qstns. 9& 10; see infra app. B (question wording). I counted as “correct” those respondents who both (1) knew
whether or not their states had passed post-Kelo eminent domain reform laws,
and (2) correctly answered the question about whether or not those laws were
effective. Respondents from the eight states that had not enacted any postKelo laws were counted as giving correct answers to both questions if they correctly answered the first question by stating that their states had not adopted
any reforms. Totals have been rounded off to the nearest whole number. The
State of Utah presented a difficult methodological dilemma because it had
banned economic development takings prior to Kelo. In the results in Table 5,
supra, it is coded as having “effective” reforms and respondents who gave that
answer were credited with a “correct” response. Coding the Utah results the
other way does not significantly alter the overall results because of the extremely low number of Utah respondents in the sample.
283. The results for Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans may be unreliable because they are based on very small sample sizes of twenty-four,
twelve, and twelve respondents respectively. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23.
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little or nothing about far more important policies. For example, polls conducted around the time of the 2004 election
showed that 70% of Americans did not know that Congress had
recently enacted a massive prescription drug bill, and 58% admitted that they knew little or nothing about the controversial
USA Patriot Act.284 What may be somewhat surprising—
especially to nonexpert observers—is that public ignorance is so
widespread despite the immense outcry that the issue has generated.
B. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF THE SAINT INDEX
DATA CONSISTENT WITH THE CLAIM THAT VOTERS WERE
ADEQUATELY INFORMED
There are several possible objections to my theory that the
Saint Index data prove the existence of widespread ignorance
about post-Kelo reform that undermines the ability of voters to
force through the sorts of policies favored by overwhelming majorities. I consider four such potential objections here and tentatively conclude that none of them withstand close scrutiny.
1. The Possibility of Respondent Forgetting
Because post-Kelo reforms were enacted over a two-year
period between the time Kelo was decided in June 2005 and the
time the Saint Index data was collected in August 2007, it is
conceivable that voters were well-informed of the contents of
their state’s legislation at the time but later forgot that knowledge. To test that hypothesis, I checked whether the respondents from Connecticut, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Ohio, Virginia, and Wyoming—the eight states whose
post-Kelo laws were enacted in 2007—had greater knowledge
than respondents in states where reform legislation passed in
2005 and 2006.285 Two of these states—Nevada and Ohio—
passed their second post-Kelo reform laws during this time period. The eight states in question all enacted eminent domain
reform laws between February 28 and July 10, 2007,286 just a
few months or weeks before the Saint Index survey was conducted, from August 1 to August 10, 2007. The data show that
284. Ilya Somin, When Ignorance Isn’t Bliss: How Political Ignorance
Threatens Democracy, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 525, Sept. 22, 2004,
at 6 tbl.1.
285. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23.
286. See supra notes 91 (Montana), 94 (Ohio), 106 (Nevada), 142 (Connecticut), 148 (Maryland), 175 (New Mexico), 190 (Virginia), 191 (Wyoming).
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the 122 respondents from those eight states had almost exactly
the same knowledge levels as those in the rest of the country.287
Twenty-six percent of respondents in the eight 2007 states
knew whether or not their states had passed post-Kelo reform
laws, a figure only slightly higher than the 20% rate compiled
by respondents from the other forty-two states.288 Similarly,
12% of respondents in these eight states could correctly answer
both the question about the existence of reform laws and the
question about their effectiveness; the figure for the other forty
four states was 13%.289 While some forgetting could have taken
place even in the few weeks between the passage of the 2007
laws and the time of the Saint Index survey, one would still expect that respondents in the eight states would be less likely to
forget than those in states that had enacted their reforms earlier. The lack of any statistical differences between the two sets
of respondents suggests that forgetting is not a major factor in
accounting for the widespread ignorance revealed in the 2007
Saint Index data. Other data also show that those voters who
do acquire political knowledge tend to retain it for many
years.290
2. The “Issue Public” Hypothesis
Public ignorance about post-Kelo reform might also be less
bleak than the data suggests if those who cared about the issue
strongly were mostly well-informed about it. This scenario
would be consistent with the “issue public” hypothesis advanced by some political scientists, which holds that citizens
are likely to be well-informed about a small number of issues
that they care about intensely even if they remain ignorant
about most others.291 However, survey data show that the percentage of the public who care intensely about eminent domain
287. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23.
288. Id. qstn. 9. Standard tests showed that the difference between the
26% and 20% figures is not statistically significant; the relevant data is available from the author.
289. Id. qstns. 9& 10.
290. See M. Kent Jennings, Political Knowledge Over Time and Across
Generations, 60 PUB. OPINION Q. 228, 243–45 (1996) (discussing relevant evidence on retention of political knowledge); Ilya Somin, Voter Knowledge and
Constitutional Change: Assessing the New Deal Experience, 45 WM. & MARY. L.
REV. 595, 639–40 (2003) (same).
291. For a recent defense of the theory, see generally VINCENT L. HUTCHINGS, PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY (2003). For discussion and criticism of this theory, see Somin, Voter Ignorance, supra note 20, at
427–29.
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reform is much greater than the mere 13% who know enough
about it to be able to determine whether their states have
passed effective post-Kelo laws or not.292 As discussed in Part I,
63% of respondents in a 2005 Saint Index survey said that they
“strongly” opposed the Kelo decision.293 A 2006 Saint Index poll
question showed that 43% “strongly” support reforms intended
to ban economic development takings.294 Even the smaller of
these two figures is still more than three times greater than
the percentage of respondents who knew whether or not their
states had passed effective reforms as of the time of the August
2007 Saint Index survey.295
Political ignorance greatly reduces the number of voters
who could potentially use the level of post-Kelo reform in their
state as a basis for electoral decisions. In other words, it greatly
diminishes the size of the potential “issue public.” Even if the
13% who gave accurate answers on the survey all feel strongly
about the issue and make effective use of that knowledge in deciding which candidates to support in state and local elections,
that still leaves several times that number of citizens who also
feel strongly about banning economic development takings but
lack the necessary knowledge to reward political leaders who
support effective reform and punish those who oppose it.
3. The “Miracle of Aggregation”
A third potentially benign interpretation of widespread ignorance of post-Kelo reform is the “miracle of aggregation.”296
Even if many or most voters are ignorant about a particular issue, that may be irrelevant to political outcomes if their errors
are randomly distributed. In that situation, ignorance-driven
votes for candidate or policy A would be offset by a similar
number of “mistaken” votes for alternative B, and electoral outcomes would be determined by the (potentially very small) minority of well-informed citizens. With respect to post-Kelo
reform, there are two serious problems with this scenario.
292. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23.
293. See supra Part I.
294. See 2006 SAINT INDEX, supra note 48; see also Somin, supra note 48,
at 1940.
295. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23.
296. See, e.g., Philip E. Converse, Popular Representation and the Distribution of Information, in INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 369, 381–
83 (John A. Ferejohn & James Kuklinski eds., 1990) (describing the “miracle
of aggregation” theory); see also DONALD A. WITTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE (1995).
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First, even random error is likely to have an important impact
on policy. Second, the errors are not in fact randomly distributed, but are skewed toward overestimation of the effectiveness of post-Kelo reform laws.297
Even if errors really are randomly distributed, the existence of widespread ignorance still greatly diminishes the
number of voters who can take account of post-Kelo reform in
choosing candidates. It likely eliminates at least 70% of those
voters who “strongly” support a ban on economic development
takings.298 This greatly reduces the potential pressure on officeholders to comply with overwhelming popular sentiment. If,
for example, 10% of the 43% of Americans who say they strongly support effective post-Kelo reform would be willing to vote on
the issue if they were informed about it, ignorance will have
reduced the number willing to change their vote based on the
issue from 4.3% of the adult population to a maximum of
1.3%.299 And even that figure unrealistically assumes that the
13% with accurate knowledge of post-Kelo reform in their
states were all drawn from among the 43% who care “strongly”
about banning economic development takings.
It is also important to recognize that respondent mistakes
about post-Kelo reform are not randomly distributed. It is far
more common for voters to believe that their state has passed
effective reform even if it has not than for them to believe that
it has not done so in cases where it actually has. As discussed
above,300 some 6% of the 2007 Saint Index survey respondents
wrongly believed that their state passed effective reform, whereas only 2% mistakenly believed that their state had failed to
enact effective reform, even though it had. The 6% figure may
not seem high in and of itself. But it constitutes more than one
third of all those respondents (17%) who had any opinion on the
effectiveness of post-Kelo reform in their states at all. Unfortunately, it is impossible to use the 2007 Saint Index data to determine whether these 17% were disproportionately drawn
from the subset of respondents most interested in post-Kelo
reform issues. However, it is plausible that they were. If so, it
is possible that the 6% of respondents who mistakenly believed
297. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23.
298. Id.
299. See 2006 SAINT INDEX, supra note 48 (43% figure). The 1.3% figure is
calculated by taking 10% of the 13% who could correctly identify the status of
post-Kelo reform in their state. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23.
300. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
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that their state has passed effective post-Kelo reform constitute
a substantial percentage of those who would otherwise use the
issue as a criterion for voting. Their ignorance deprived them of
the opportunity to use their votes to reward politicians who
support effective reform and punish those who oppose it.
4. Opinion Leaders as Sources of Information
Finally, it is possible that voters could learn about the effectiveness or lack thereof of post-Kelo laws by relying on the
statements of interest groups and other “opinion leaders” who
have incentives to be better informed than ordinary citizens.301
However, as I have discussed at greater length elsewhere, reliance on opinion leaders itself requires considerable knowledge, including the knowledge needed to select opinion leaders
to follow who appear to be both knowledgeable and trustworthy. 302 Moreover, the ways in which the Kelo issue cuts across
traditional party and ideological lines makes it more difficult
for voters to identify opinion leaders to follow based on traditional political cues, such as partisan or ideological affiliation.303 In addition, the failure of the opinion leader “information shortcut” to alleviate ignorance on less complex and more
important issues than post-Kelo reform304 suggests that it will
be of only limited utility in this case. Most important of all, the
widespread ignorance revealed in the Saint Index survey shows
that most citizens either did not acquire relevant information
from opinion leaders or obtained information that turned out to
be misleading about the true effectiveness of reform laws in
their states.305
C. POLITICAL IGNORANCE AS AN EXPLANATION FOR THE
ANOMALIES OF THE BACKLASH
The political ignorance hypothesis gains traction from the
fact that it can account for three otherwise anomalous aspects
301. See, for example, ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE
DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW?
206–08 (1998), for the argument that reliance on opinion leaders can alleviate
the problem of political ignorance.
302. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Book Note, Resolving the Democratic Dilemma?,
16 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 408–11 (1999).
303. See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 301, at 206 (arguing that voters
often choose opinion leaders based on common interest or trust).
304. See Somin, Voter Ignorance, supra note 20, at 424 –26, for a more detailed discussion.
305. See supra Part III.A.
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of the Kelo controversy: the massive backlash against a decision
that largely reaffirmed existing case law that had previously
excited little public controversy; the paucity of effective reform
measures despite widespread public opposition to economic development takings; and the striking divergence between citizen-initiated referendum initiatives and all other types of postKelo reform measures.
1. Explaining the Timing of the Kelo Backlash
Some Kelo defenders complain that the backlash against
the decision was excessive in light of the fact that the case
made little change in existing law.306 After all, eminent domain
was not a prominent national issue before Kelo, even though
existing constitutional doctrine permitted economic development takings under the Federal Constitution. A spokesman for
California redevelopment agencies lamented that Kelo led to “a
hue and cry about how bad things are in California, yet Kelo
changed nothing.”307 But the reaction is understandable once
we recognize that—for most people—Kelo was the first inkling
they ever had that private property could be condemned merely
to promote economic development by other private parties. This
sudden realization led to outrage and a desire for change.308
Public ignorance helps explain why economic development takings could become so common despite the fact that the vast majority of citizens oppose condemnation of private property for
such purposes.309 It is likely that, prior to Kelo, most of the public did not even realize that economic development condemnations existed. The public ignorance hypothesis is arguably the
only explanation for the suddenness of the Kelo backlash. It also helps explain why there was relatively little public pressure
to reform eminent domain law before Kelo.
2. Explaining the Paucity of Effective Reform Laws
Public ignorance is also the best available explanation for
the seeming scarcity of effective post-Kelo reform laws. The
306. Cf. supra Part I.A–B (explaining how Kelo made little change in existing doctrine).
307. See Michael Gardner, Lawmakers Rethink Land-Seizure Laws, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 17, 2005, at A1 (quoting John Shirey’s statement
about Kelo).
308. Cf. supra Part I.B (discussing public condemnation of the Kelo decision).
309. See infra Part I.B.
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highly publicized Supreme Court decision apparently increased
awareness of eminent domain abuse, perhaps as a result of extensive press coverage. But while the publicity surrounding Kelo made much of the public at least somewhat aware of the issue of economic development takings, it probably did not lead
voters to scrutinize the details of proposed reform legislation.
The Saint Index survey showed that almost 80% of Americans
do not even know whether their state has passed a reform law
at all.310
Few citizens have the time or inclination to delve into such
matters and many are often ignorant of the very existence of
even the most important legislative items.311 Thus, it would not
be difficult for state legislators to seek to satisfy voter demands
by supporting “position-taking” legislation that purported to
curb eminent domain,312 while in reality having little effect. In
this way, they can simultaneously cater to public outrage over
Kelo and mollify developers and other interest groups that benefit from economic development condemnations.
This strategy seems to have been at the root of the failure
of post-Kelo reform efforts in California. In that state, legislative reform efforts were initially sidetracked by the introduction of weak proposals that gave lawmakers “a chance . . . to
side with the anti-eminent domain sentiment without doing
any real damage to redevelopment agencies.”313 At a later stage
in the political battle, the Democratic majority in the state legislature tabled even these modest reforms by claiming that
they were being blocked by the Republican minority, despite
the fact that “the stalled bills required only simple majority
votes and thus needed no Republicans to go along.”314 As one
Sacramento reporter put it, the entire process may have been
“just a feint to pretend to do something about eminent domain
without actually doing anything to upset the apple cart.”315
Eventually, California did enact some reforms, but only ones
310. 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23, qstn. 9.
311. See, e.g., Somin, supra note 284, at 6 tbl.1 (providing survey data that
the majority of citizens are unaware of basic facts of several of the most important pieces of legislation adopted by Congress in the 2003–04 term).
312. See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 61–
73, 114 –15, 121–25 (1974), for a discussion of the concept of position-taking
legislation.
313. Dan Walters, Eminent Domain Bills Are Stalled–Except One for Casino Tribe, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 16, 2005, at A3.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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that are almost completely ineffective.316 A leading advocate for
eminent domain reform in Nevada believes that, in his state as
well, legislators sought to “look good while not upsetting anyone.”317
The California League of Cities (“CLC”), an organization
composed of local governments with an interest in preserving
their eminent domain authority, also sought to exploit political
ignorance about post-Kelo reform. The CLC succeeded in placing an essentially meaningless eminent domain reform referendum initiative—Proposition 99—on the state’s 2008 ballot
as a way of preempting a stronger referendum initiative sponsored by property rights advocates.318 As discussed above,
Proposition 99 cleverly included a provision stating that it
would supersede any other eminent domain referendum
enacted on the same day, so long as the latter gotfewer votes
than the CLC proposal.319
Such maneuvers would be difficult to bring off if the public
paid close attention to pending legislation, but they can be
quite effective in the presence of widespread political ignorance. Unfortunately, public ignorance of the details of eminent
domain policy is unlikely to be easily remedied.
3. Explaining the Relative Success of Citizen-Initiated
Referendum Initiatives
As we have already seen, there is a great difference between the effectiveness of citizen-initiated referendum initiatives and all other types of post-Kelo reforms. Four of the five
citizen-initiated referenda passed since Kelo provide strong
protection for property owners against economic development
takings.320 By contrast, only fourteen of thirty six state legislative initiatives are comparably effective, as are only two or
three of six legislature-initiated referenda.321 Reforms initiated
by Congress and the President at the federal level are also
largely cosmetic in nature.322
316. See supra Part II.A.1.b.i.
317. Interview with Steven Miller, Vice President for Policy, Nev. Policy
Research Inst. (Mar. 14, 2007) (on file with author). Nevada eventually passed
effective eminent domain reform by referendum. See supra Part II.A.3; see also
supra text accompanying note 115.
318. See discussion of Proposition 99 supra Part II.A.3.
319. See discussion of Proposition 99 supra Part II.A.3.
320. See supra tbl.3.
321. See supra tbl.3.
322. Cf. Part I.B (noting the widespread political opposition resulted in lit-
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The likely explanation for this striking pattern is consistent with the political ignorance hypothesis. Citizen-initiated
referendum proposals are usually drafted by activists rather
than by elected officials and their staffs. This was the case with
all four of the post-Kelo citizen-initiated referenda enacted in
2006.323 Unlike state legislators, the property rights activists
who wrote the citizen-initiated anti-Kelo ballot initiatives had
no need to appease powerful pro-condemnation interest groups
in order to improve reelection chances, and they also had little
reason to promote reforms that fail to produce real changes in
policy. Unlike ordinary citizens, committed activists in a position to draft referendum proposals and get them on the ballot
have strong incentives to acquire detailed information about
eminent domain law; they have a real chance of influencing policy outcomes through their actions. Obviously, property rights
activists can and do influence legislatively enacted reforms as
well. However, in this scenario, anything they propose is likely
to be filtered through the legislative process, where organized
interest groups will inevitably have a significant say.
California’s Proposition 99, the one citizen-initiated referendum measure that does not provide meaningful protection
to property owners, is the exception that proves the rule. Proposition 99 was not drafted by property rights activists, but rather by local governments and other interest groups seeking to
protect broad eminent domain authority by forestalling a rival
tle meaningful legislative reform).
323. The Arizona initiative was undertaken by an activist group known as
the Arizona Home Owners’ Protection Effort. See Arizona Secretary of State,
Proposition 207, available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/Info/
PubPamphlet/english/Prop207.htm. The Nevada law was put on the ballot by
the People’s Initiative to Stop the Taking of Our Land (“PISTOL”), along with
other individuals. See Nevadans for the Protection of Prop. Rights, Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1235, 1238–39 (Nev. 2006) (listing the respondents to the initiative petition of “Nevada Property Owners’ Bill of Rights,” which sought to
amend the Nevada Constitution with respect to eminent domain). In North
Dakota, the ballot initiative was sponsored by a group known as Citizens to
Restrict Eminent Domain) (C-RED). See NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, 2006 BALLOT MEASURE OVERVIEW 37, 48 (2007), available at http://www
.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/5780/2007110512006BallotReport_
Overview.pdf?sequence-1 (demonstrating that C-RED raised all of the contributions in support of Measure 2, which prohibits government takings of private property for economic development). In Oregon, the post-Kelo initiative
was filed by the Oregonians in Action Political Action Committee. See MEASURE ARGUMENT FOR STATE VOTERS’ PAMPHLET FOR MEASURE 39 (on file with
author). Oregonians in Action is a property rights activist group. See Oregonians in Action, Background Information, http://www.oia.org/index.php/aboutus (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
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ballot measure that would have provided stronger protection
for property owners.324 Proposition 99 passed easily, getting
some 63% of the vote;325 although we do not have any definitive
data, it is likely that California voters could not tell the difference between a referendum measure that provided meaningful
new protection for property owners and one that did not. The
sponsors of Proposition 99 achieved their goal of defeating the
rival Proposition 98, though the defeat of the latter was at least
in large part the result of its inclusion of a phase out of rent
control.326
The Proposition 99 experience supports my conjecture that
citizen-initiated referenda provide effective protection because
of the identity and purposes of their drafters. When the drafters are property rights activists seeking to ban Kelo-style takings, citizen-initiated referenda result in strong limitations on
eminent domain. When initiatives are drafted by procondemnation interest groups such as the California League of
Cities, they will most likely provide only cosmetic reforms. Either way, rationally ignorant voters are likely to support them.
D. INTEREST GROUP POWER AS AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION
The most obvious alternative explanation for the scarcity of
effective reform laws is the political power of developers and
other organized interest groups that benefit from the transfer
of property condemned as a result of economic development and
blight condemnations.327 There is little question that this factor
does play a role. Developers, local government planning officials, and other interest groups have indeed spearheaded opposition to post-Kelo reform.328 In Texas, for example, advocates
of strong eminent domain reform concluded that lobbying by
developers and local governments played a key role in ensuring
that that state passed an essentially toothless reform law.329
However, the interest group explanation has three crucial
shortcomings relative to the political ignorance hypothesis. It
324. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
325. See Young, supra note 223.
326. See id. (noting role of rent-control phase out in stimulating opposition
to Proposition 98).
327. See, e.g., Sandefur, supra note 14, at 768–72 (arguing that interestgroup opposition and local government complicity accounts for the failures of
the Kelo backlash).
328. Id.
329. Interview with Brooke Rollins, President & CEO, Tex. Pub. Policy
Found. (Mar. 17, 2007) (on file with author).
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cannot explain why the Kelo backlash arose when it did; it cannot fully explain how a small coalition of interest groups could
overcome overwhelming and strongly-felt majority public opinion; and, it cannot explain why states would pass ineffective
reform laws, as opposed to simply doing nothing.
As discussed above, the Kelo backlash arose in 2005 despite the fact that Kelo made little change in existing Supreme
Court takings doctrine.330 Interest group theory cannot explain
this fact. After all, pro-property rights interest groups sought to
restrain takings even before Kelo. Supporters of broad eminent
domain power were satisfied with the status quo both before
and afterwards. By contrast, the theory of rational political ignorance can readily account for the timing of the backlash.
Second, the mere existence of interest group opposition
does not explain why state legislators would choose to satisfy a
few small interest groups while going against the preferences of
the vast majority of the electorate.331 It is possible that the procondemnation interest groups simply have more intense preferences about the issue than most of the opponents in the general public, and are therefore more likely to cast their votes based
on politicians’ stances on the issue. However, 63% of the respondents in the 2005 Saint Index survey said that they not only
opposed Kelo, but felt “strongly” about it;332 more recent survey
data shows that 43% of Americans “strongly support” reform
legislation banning economic development takings.333 If just a
fraction of the 63%—or even the 43%—were willing to let postKelo reform influence their voting decisions, they would probably constitute a much larger voting bloc than all the pro-Kelo
developers and government officials put together. For example,
if 10% of those who felt “strongly” about the issue were willing
to switch their votes as a result, they would constitute a voting
bloc of about 4 to 6% of the electorate—more than enough to
change the outcome of a close election. Presumably, that would
give candidates strong incentives to support effective bans on
economic development takings.
For this reason, it is likely that, to the extent that interest
group opposition was able to stymie effective post-Kelo reform
and force the passage of merely cosmetic legislation, this result
occurred only because most ordinary voters are unaware of
330.
331.
332.
333.

See supra Part I.A–B; see also Part III.B.1.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra text accompanying note 47.
See Somin, supra note 48, at 1940 tbl.2.

2170

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:2100

what is happening. Political ignorance is the handmaiden of interest group power in the political process. Interest group power did play a role in the enactment of ineffective post-Kelo reforms. Without it, legislators would have little to lose from the
enactment of stronger reform measures. But the legislators are
able to satisfy interest group demands only because of public
ignorance. Absent widespread ignorance, interest groups at
odds with the majority of the general public would find it far
more difficult to block eminent domain reform.
Finally, interest group power cannot explain why some
twenty-four states passed ineffective post-Kelo reform laws instead of simply doing nothing. After all, pro-condemnation interest groups would have been satisfied with the continuation
of the pre-Kelo status quo, which in these states already allowed the condemnation of property for almost any reason.
Why waste valuable legislative time and attention on legislation that merely perpetuates the status quo? Interest group
power alone cannot account for this. By contrast, political ignorance theory has a simple and compelling explanation for the
enactment of ineffective reform laws: they could be used to persuade rationally ignorant voters that the something had been
doneto solve the problem of economic development takings even
if the new legislation would have little or no real impact.334
The political ignorance hypothesis does not completely explain the pattern we have observed. For example, it does not
account for the fact that a few state legislatures, notably Florida, enacted strong reforms. However, it is more consistent with
the available evidence than any alternative theory proposed so
far. Certainly, it is better supported than either the argument
that interest groups have stymied reform or the theory that
elected officials will have little choice but to yield to the broad
consensus of public opinion. Further research will be necessary
to fully test the political ignorance hypothesis and compare it to
rival theories.
CONCLUSION
So far, the Kelo backlash has yielded far less effective
reform than many expected. This result is striking in light of
the overwhelming public opposition to the decision. Critics of
Kelo will lament the result, while defenders may be heartened
by it. Both can agree that the anti-Kelo backlash has not turned
334. See supra Part III.B.2.
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out to be a complete substitute for strong judicial enforcement
of public use limits on eminent domain.
The evidence also supports the tentative conclusion that
the relative paucity of effective reform is in large part a result
of widespread political ignorance. This hypothesis is the only
one proposed so far that can account for the conjunction of
three anomalies: the sudden and massive public outrage
against Kelo, despite the fact that the decision made few
changes in existing law; the scarcity of effective reforms despite
deep and broad public opposition to economic development takings; and the striking divergence between citizen-initiated referenda and all post-Kelo laws enacted by other means. It is also
supported by recent Saint Index survey data documenting
widespread public ignorance of post-Kelo reform.
There is much room for future research. For example, scholars should make a systematic effort to explain why a few state
legislatures, notably Florida, enacted very strong post-Kelo reforms despite the fact that their states engaged in extensive
private to private condemnations previously. As yet, we have
no clear explanation of why these states differed from most
others. Detailed examination of their legislative processes
might give us greater insight.
The partial failure of the Kelo backlash also highlights an
important limitation of claims that judicial review is not
needed to protect individual rights that enjoy the backing of
majority public opinion.335 Despite broad and strongly felt public opposition to Kelo and economic development takings, both
the federal government and the majority of states failed to
enact effective reform legislation banning them. If public ignorance could prevent the political process from providing effective
protection for individual rights in such a high-profile case, it
might also fall short in other cases where rights supported by
majority opinion are at stake. Judicial review is not just a
check on the tyranny of the majority. Sometimes, it may also be
needed to protect us against the consequences of the majority’s
political ignorance.
The political response to Kelo is a striking example of public backlash against an unpopular judicial decision. It also
shows that backlash politics has its limits.

335. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL TABLES
Table A1:
Post-Kelo Reform in States Ranked by Number of “Threatened” Private-to-Private Condemnations
Effectiveness of Reform337
State
Number of
Threatened
Takings336
Florida
2,055
Effective (L & LR)
Maryland
1,110
Ineffective (L)
California
635
Ineffective (L)
New Jersey
589
No Reform
Missouri
437
Ineffective (L)
Ohio
331
Ineffective (L)
Michigan
173
Effective (L & LR)
Utah
167
Enacted Prior to Kelo
Kentucky
161
Ineffective (L)
Texas
118
Ineffective (L)
Colorado
114
Ineffective (L)
Pennsylvania
108
Effective (L)
New York
89
No Reform
Minnesota
83
Effective (L)
Rhode Island
65
Ineffective (L)
Connecticut
61
Ineffective (L)
Indiana
51
Effective (L)
Arkansas
40
No Reform
Tennessee
37
Ineffective (L)
Virginia
27
Effective (L)
Nevada
15
Effective (L & CR)
Vermont
15
Ineffective (L)
West Virginia
12
Ineffective (L)
Wisconsin
12
Ineffective (L)
Nebraska
11
Ineffective (L)
Arizona
10
Effective (CR)
Illinois
9
Ineffective (L)
Kansas
7
Effective (L)
South Carolina
7
Ineffective (LR)
Hawaii
5
No Reform
Massachusetts
4
No Reform
Oregon
2
Effective (CR)
Delaware
0
Ineffective (L)
Georgia
0
Effective (L & LR)
Idaho
0
Effective (L)
336. See BERLINER, supra note 66. This data on known eminent domain
condemnations by state includes developments from 1998 to 2002. Id. at 8–9.
337. As determined in January 2008.
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South Dakota
0
Effective (L)
Wyoming
0
Effective (L)
Alabama
0
Effective (L)
Alaska
0
Ineffective (L)
Iowa
0
Ineffective (L)
Louisiana
0
Effective (LR)
Maine
0
Ineffective (L)
Mississippi
0
No Reform
Montana
0
Ineffective (L)
New Hampshire
0
Effective (L & LR)
New Mexico
0
Effective (L)
North Carolina
0
Ineffective (L)
North Dakota
0
Effective (CR)
Oklahoma
0
No Reform
Washington
0
No Reform
L=Reform enacted by state legislature; CR=Reform enacted by citizeninitiated referendum; LR=Reform enacted by legislature-initiated referendum.
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Table A2:
Post-Kelo Reform in States Ranked by Number of Private-to-Private
Condemnations Per 1 Million people
Takings339/
Effectiveness of
State
2005
1M people
Reform340
Population338
Pennsylvania
12,429,616
202.5
Effective (L)
Kansas
2,744,687
56.5
Effective (L)
Maryland
5,600,388
22.7
Ineffective (L)
Michigan
10,120,860
13.6
Effective (L & LR)
Rhode Island
1,076,189
11.2
Ineffective (L)
Connecticut
3,510,297
8.8
Ineffective (L)
Ohio
11,464,042
7.9
Ineffective (L)
Virginia
7,567,465
7.7
Effective (L)
Oklahoma
3,547,884
6.5
No Reform
California
36,132,147
6.2
Ineffective (L)
New Jersey
8,717,925
5.9
No Reform
Tennessee
5,962,959
4.9
Ineffective (L)
Colorado
4,665,177
4.9
Ineffective (L)
West Virginia
1,816,856
4.4
Ineffective (L)
Florida
17,789,864
3.8
Effective (L & LR)
Missouri
5,800,310
3.1
Ineffective (L)
New York
19,254,630
3
No Reform
Arizona
5,939,292
1.9
Effective (CR)
Minnesota
5,132,799
1.8
Effective (L)
Alabama
4,557,808
1.8
Effective (L)
Washington
6,287,759
1.7
No Reform
Kentucky
4,173,405
1.7
Ineffective (L)
North Dakota
636,677
1.6
Effective (CR)
Maine
1,321,505
1.5
Ineffective (L)
Iowa
2,966,334
1.3
Ineffective (L)
Nevada
2,414,807
1.2
Effective (L & CR)
Louisiana
4,523,628
1.1
Effective (LR)
Mississippi
2,921,088
1
No Reform
Massachusetts
6,398,743
0.8
No Reform
Illinois
12,763,371
0.6
Ineffective (L)
Indiana
6,271,973
0.6
Effective (L)
Nebraska
1,758,787
0.6
Ineffective (L)
Texas
22,859,968
0.5
Ineffective (L)
Arkansas
2,779,154
0.4
No Reform
North Carolina
8,683,242
0.1
Ineffective (L)
338. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION
FOR THE UNITED STATES AND STATES, AND FOR PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2000 TO
JULY 1, 2005 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-

ann-est2005.html.
339. Some takings affected more than one property. See BERLINER, supra
note 66 (reporting filed condemnations per state).
340. As determined in January 2008.
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Alaska
Delaware
Georgia
Idaho
South Dakota
Wyoming
Hawaii
Montana
New Hampshire
New Mexico
Oregon
South Carolina

663,661
843,524
9,072,576
1,429,096
775,933
509,294
1,275,194
935,670
1,309,940
1,928,384
3,641,056
4,255,083

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Ineffective (L)
Ineffective (L)
Effective (L & LR)
Effective (L)
Effective (L)
Effective (L)
No Reform
Ineffective (L)
Effective (L & LR)
Effective (L)
Effective (CR)
Ineffective (LR)
Enacted Prior to
Kelo
Utah
2,469,585
0
Vermont
623,050
0
Ineffective (L)
Wisconsin
5,536,201
0
Ineffective (L)
L=Reform enacted by state legislature; CR=Reform enacted by citizeninitiated referendum; LR=Reform enacted by legislature-initiated referendum.
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Table A3:
Post-Kelo Reform in States Ranked by Number of Threatened Privateto-Private Condemnations Per 1 Million People
Threatened Effectiveness of
State
2005
Takings342
Reform343
Popula/1M people
tion341
Maryland
5,600,388
198.2
Ineffective (L)
Effective (L &
Florida
17,789,864
115.5
LR)
Missouri
5,800,310
75.3
Ineffective (L)
Enacted Prior to
Utah
2,469,585
67.6
Kelo
New Jersey
8,717,925
67.6
No Reform
Rhode Island
1,076,189
60.4
Ineffective (L)
Kentucky
4,173,405
38.6
Ineffective (L)
Ohio
11,464,042
28.9
Ineffective (L)
Colorado
4,665,177
24.4
Ineffective (L)
Vermont
623,050
24.1
Ineffective (L)
California
36,132,147
17.6
Ineffective (L)
Connecticut
3,510,297
17.4
Ineffective (L)
Effective (L &
Michigan
10,120,860
17.1
LR)
Minnesota
5,132,799
16.2
Effective (L)
Arkansas
2,779,154
14.4
No Reform
Pennsylvania
12,429,616
8.7
Effective (L)
Indiana
6,271,973
8.1
Effective (L)
West Virginia
1,816,856
6.6
Ineffective (L)
Nebraska
1,758,787
6.3
Ineffective (L)
Nevada
2,414,807
6.2
Effective (L &CR)
Tennessee
5,962,959
6.2
Ineffective (L)
Texas
22,859,968
5.2
Ineffective (L)
New York
19,254,630
4.6
No Reform
Hawaii
1,275,194
3.9
No Reform
Virginia
7,567,465
3.6
Effective (L)
Kansas
2,744,687
2.6
Effective (L)
Wisconsin
5,536,201
2.2
Ineffective (L)
Arizona
5,939,292
1.7
Effective (CR)
South Carolina
4,255,083
1.6
Ineffective (LR)
Illinois
12,763,371
0.7
Ineffective (L)
Massachusetts
6,398,743
0.6
No Reform
Oregon
3,641,056
0.5
Effective (CR)
Delaware
843,524
0
Ineffective (L)
Georgia
9,072,576
0
Effective (L &
341. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 338.
342. Some takings affected more than one property. See BERLINER, supra
note 66.
343. As determined in January 2008.
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LR)
Effective (L)
Effective (L)
Effective (L)
Effective (L)
Ineffective (L)
Ineffective (L)
Effective (LR)
Ineffective (L)
No Reform
Ineffective (L)
Effective (L &
New Hampshire
1,309,940
0
LR)
New Mexico
1,928,384
0
Effective (L)
North Carolina
8,683,242
0
Ineffective (L)
North Dakota
636,677
0
Effective (CR)
Oklahoma
3,547,884
0
No Reform
Washington
6,287,759
0
No Reform
L=Reform enacted by state legislature; CR=Reform enacted by citizeninitiated referendum; LR=Reform enacted by legislature-initiated referendum.
Idaho
South Dakota
Wyoming
Alabama
Alaska
Iowa
Louisiana
Maine
Mississippi
Montana

1,429,096
775,933
509,294
4,557,808
663,661
2,966,334
4,523,628
1,321,505
2,921,088
935,670

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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APPENDIX B: 2007 SAINT INDEX SURVEY QUESTIONS
ON POST-KELO REFORM344
Question 9.
In 2005, the US Supreme Court ruled that the government
could take private property by eminent domain to give it to
another private owner to promote economic development. Since
that ruling, some states have passed new laws that restrict the
government’s power to take private property. Do you happen to
know if your state is one of those that has passed such a law?
A. Yes, my state has enacted at least one such law
B. No, it has not enacted any laws like that
C. Don’t know
Question 10 (asked only of those who chose answer A on
Question 9).
Do you think that the new laws in your state will be effective in preventing the condemnation of private property for
economic development?
A. Very effective
B. Somewhat effective
C. Mostly ineffective
D. Completely ineffective
E. Don’t know
Note: For purposes of Table 6, I counted the first two answers as “effective” and the second two as “ineffective” and
marked “don’t know” as automatically mistaken. Respondents
in states that had passed ineffective reforms were given credit
for “correct” answers if they picked either C or D. Those in
states with effective laws similarly counted as “correct” if they
chose either A or B.

344. See 2007 SAINT INDEX, supra note 23, qstns. 9 & 10.

